Light On The Mayo: Recent Developments May Diminish The Impact Of Mayo Foundation On Judicial Deference To Tax Regulations by Melone, Matthew A.
Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 13
Number 2 Winter 2017 Article 1
Winter 2017
Light On The Mayo: Recent Developments May
Diminish The Impact Of Mayo Foundation On
Judicial Deference To Tax Regulations
Matthew A. Melone
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew A. Melone, Light On The Mayo: Recent Developments May Diminish The Impact Of Mayo Foundation On Judicial Deference To
Tax Regulations, 13 Hastings Bus. L.J. 149 (2017).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol13/iss2/1
1 - MELONE MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2017 11:08 AM 
 
[149] 
Light on the Mayo: Recent Developments 
May Diminish the Impact of Mayo 
Foundation on Judicial Deference to Tax 
Regulations 
 
Matthew A. Melone* 
 
Treasury regulations that require controlled entities that are 
parties to research cost-sharing arrangements to share of equity 
compensation costs allocable to research personnel have been 
controversial for twenty years. Therefore, I was not surprised when 
the Tax Court invalidated the regulations in 2015. That is, I was not 
surprised until I read the court’s decision and discovered the reason 
for the invalidation.  The court wielded an administrative law 
doctrine that had surfaced in a tax case a few years earlier.1  The 
earlier case concerned a very technical tax accounting issue and 
generated relatively little attention.2  The more recent case, however, 
implicated billions of dollars in taxes and concerned the very visible 
issue of tax base erosion.3  Moreover, because it was the second case in 
recent years to apply an administrative law doctrine unfamiliar to the tax 
area, the Treasury should be concerned.  
The Treasury scored a major victory in 2011 when the Supreme Court 
held that its regulations are entitled to the same standard of review 
applicable to regulations issued by other agencies.4  Last year, however, the 
Court refused to defer to the Treasury in its third decision concerning the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.5  That decision should have 
raised some concern for the Treasury.  This decision and the two 
aforementioned decisions provide taxpayers fodder with which to challenge 
the validity of tax regulations.  The Treasury’s victory in 2011 may have 
been, to some extent, pyrrhic. 
 
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; C.P.A.; Professor of Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, 
PA.  
1. See infra notes 196-217 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 230-95 and accompanying text; See also Richard Rubin, Alphabet Is in Line 
As Winner in IRS Case, WALL ST. J. Feb. 29, 2016, at B6 (reporting that the court’s decision could save 
Google’s parent company at least $3.5 billion in federal income taxes). 
4. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 96-141 and accompanying text. 
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Part I of this article briefly describes the developments that led to the 
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, a statute enacted to rein in the 
growing power and influence of administrative agencies.  This part also 
discusses Treasury rulemaking and the agency’s rather cavalier relationship 
with the Administrative Procedure Act.  The Treasury long had asserted 
that regulations issued pursuant to a general statutory grant of authority 
were not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.  Moreover, the 
increased complexity of the tax code over the past thirty years led the 
Treasury to more frequently issue regulations in temporary form without 
the niceties of formal Notice and Comment procedures and to issue 
substantive, often controversial rules, informally.  
As a consequence, Treasury actions were not always afforded the 
same level of deference enjoyed by other agencies’ actions.  Part II 
discusses the standards of review that the courts applied to Treasury 
regulations.  This had been an area of considerable confusion after the 
Supreme Court’s landmark Chevron decision for almost three decades.  
This part reviews the standards of review that existed pre-Chevron and the 
confusion regarding Chevron’s application to tax regulations.  In 2011, the 
Court clarified that tax regulations are reviewable under the standards 
applicable to regulations in general, firmly rejecting any notions of tax 
exceptionalism.   
As a result, Treasury regulations are pari passu with other regulations 
and are entitled to Chevron deference to the same extent as other 
regulations.  At the time, this result was considered an unmitigated victory 
for the Treasury because less deferential standards of review would no 
longer apply to certain tax regulations.  However, in light of recent 
developments the Treasury’s victory may have been a mixed blessing.  Part 
III of this article discusses the Court’s decision in King v. Burwell.  This 
highly publicized—and politicized—case concerned the interpretation of 
the tax credit provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
The Court agreed with the Treasury’s position on the issue but it did so 
without deferring to the agency.  In so doing, the Court raised some 
interesting possibilities with respect to taxpayer challenges to Treasury 
authority.  
Part III describes a more troublesome development for the Treasury.  
Approximately one year before Chevron, the Court set forth another 
landmark administrative law doctrine in its State Farm decision.  That 
decision held that, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies 
must articulate the reasons for their regulatory choices and such choices 
must be reasonably connected to the facts found by the agencies.  State 
Farm has not been applied by the Court to any tax regulations and this 
doctrine was—for all intents and purposes—ignored by the tax bar.  
However, two courts, invoking State Farm, recently have invalidated 
Treasury regulations.  This Part III analyzes and critiques these cases.  
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Many scholars and practitioners believe that Chevron and State Farm are 
inseparable because the latter is incorporated into the former.  However, I 
disagree and believe that State Farm—in many circumstances—provides 
independent grounds with which to challenge tax regulations. 
 
TREASURY RULEMAKING: A CASUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
 
The days when our economy operated largely without the watchful 
eyes of a vast federal bureaucracy upon it are long gone and it is difficult to 
imagine things otherwise.6  However, the federal government had limited 
involvement in our nation’s economic affairs for almost half of its history.  
The administrative state was spawned and grew, in part, as a counterweight 
to the growth in power of business enterprises.  Not surprisingly, it did not 
take much time for the counterweight to need its own counterweight.  A sea 
change in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution and the 
exigencies of World War II led to concerns that administrative agencies 
had accumulated too much power and too often wielded that power in 
inappropriate ways.  As a result, Congress enacted major reform legislation 
after the war.  In the seven decades since, the Treasury has operated in its 
own regulatory environment, subjecting itself to the rules by which 
agencies in general, operate in some, but not all, cases. 
 
THE GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 
The importance of the federal government’s role in the nation’s 
economic affairs increased in response to the industrialization of the 
economy during the nineteenth century and to the post-Civil War need to 
protect the newly acquired rights of African-Americans.  The Progressive 
movement inserted, rather fitfully thanks to Lochner,7 the public sector in 
theretofore private matters.  The creation of the Interstate Commerce 
 
6. One study reports that in 2015 Congress enacted 114 statutes and the regulatory agencies 
issued 3,410 regulations.  The direct and indirect cost of compliance with regulatory burdens was 
estimated to be almost $1.9 trillion, or almost $15,000 per household; See Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Ten 
Thousand Commandments, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (2016), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne 
%20Crews%20-%20Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202016%20-%20May%204%202 016.pdf.  
7. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a New York statute regulating 
the hours of bakers was an unconstitutional infringement on the right and liberty to contract). The 
Lochner era is considered to have closed with the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379 (1937), a decision that upheld the constitutionality of Washington state’s minimum wage 
law and overturned an earlier precedent to the contrary, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 
(1923). 
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Commission in 1887 marked the birth of what would become an immense 
federal bureaucracy and the Progressive period resulted in the increased 
regulation of railroads, the institution of occupational licensing, and the 
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act.8  The Supreme Court’s initial 
resistance to expansive federal powers over economic matters, manifested 
most dramatically in Dagenhart,9 eventually succumbed to the onslaught of 
New Deal legislation.10  The alphabet soup of agencies to which we are 
now beholden came into existence and, not surprisingly, grew both in 
number and power.  The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 
1946 was the result of objections to the increasing power of executive 
branch agencies, particularly during World War II, the waning popularity 
of the Democratic Party, and the realization by reform proponents that 
procedural safeguards were necessary in the face of the courts’ reluctance 
to rein in the agencies.11  
A detailed analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act is beyond the 
scope of this work.  The Act’s purposes are to inform the public about 
agencies’ procedures, rules, and organization; provide the public with the 
opportunity to participate in the rule making process; establish standards 
for the promulgation of rules and adjudicating disputes; and set forth the 
scope of judicial review of agencies’ actions.12  Except for military, foreign 
affairs, and certain managerial, personnel, and other matters not relevant 
here, the Act requires that notice and comment procedures be adhered to in 
the promulgation of proposed regulations.13  However, the notice and 
comments requirements do not apply to interpretive rules, general 
 
8. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439–66 (2d. ed. 
1985). 
9. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that compliance with child-labor 
standards was beyond the reach of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce). 
10. The Court’s narrow interpretation of the commerce power came to an end with its decision 
in the seminal case of N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)(upholding the 
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935). Any doubts as to the extent of the 
federal commerce power were laid to rest several years later in Wickard v. Filburn., 317 U.S. 111 
(1942)(holding that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate 
activity that has an indirect effect on such commerce). 
11. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–706 (2016)); Anthony W. 
Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and its Implications in a Post-
Dodd-Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 770–85 (2012).  
12. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (Wm. W. 
Gaunt & Sons 1973), available at http://archive.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/attorneygenerals manual.pdf.  
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)-(b) (2016).  In general, final regulations may not take effect within 30 
days after notice is given. However, this requirement is inapplicable to regulations that relieve burdens 
on those persons subject to the regulations. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(1)(2016). Tax regulations that are 
favorable to taxpayers may be insulated from taxpayer challenges due to lack of standing.  See infra 
note 36 and accompanying text. Not all taxpayer-friendly regulations will be so insulated, however.  For 
example, standing was no barrier to challenges to Treasury regulations that interpreted the availability 
of tax credits provided by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in a manner favorable to 
taxpayers because the availability of tax credits to some taxpayers triggered particularized burdens on 
other taxpayers.  See infra notes 113, 117 and accompanying text. 
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statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice.14  Moreover, an agency may dispense with notice and comment if 
the agency finds, with good cause, that notice and comment procedures are 
impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.15 
 
Treasury Rulemaking  
 
The Treasury has exhibited a degree of cognitive dissonance with 
respect to the applicability of certain provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act to its rulemaking actions.16  The Treasury derives its 
regulatory authority from two sources.  First, Congress may delegate it the 
authority to issue rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of a 
specific statute within the statute itself.  The extent of the regulatory 
authority granted to the Treasury in this manner typically is phrased in 
broad language that authorizes the Treasury to prescribe regulations as may 
be necessary and appropriate to carry out the statutory provisions in 
question although it is not uncommon for Congress to reference specific 
provisions within the statute indicating its expectation that regulations will 
be forthcoming with respect to those provisions.17 A second source of 
regulatory authority is Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 7805(a) 
which delegates general regulatory authority to the Treasury for the 
enforcement of the I.R.C.18   
The Treasury took the position that regulations issued under the latter 
delegation of authority were interpretative and, therefore, not subject to the 
 
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2016). 
15. Id.  An agency that invokes the good cause exception must set forth its reasons for doing so. 
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B)(2016).  The Attorney General’s Manual and the courts have interpreted the good 
cause exception to apply in cases when timely guidance is critical and the notice and comments 
requirement would impose an impediment to such timely guidance, minor rules with little public 
interest, and the somewhat unusual case in which notice and comment would be counterproductive.  See 
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1782 (2008).  
16. The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) delegates regulatory authority to the Secretary of the 
Treasury.  The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), however, has a significant role in the drafting of 
regulations.  See id. at 1154, n.3. 
17. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263A(i), 409A(e), 469(l)(CCH 2016). 
18. I.R.C. § 7805(a)(CCH 2016). With certain exceptions, proposed, temporary, or final 
regulations cannot have retroactive effect.  I.R.C. § 7805(b)(CCH 2016).  Temporary regulations must 
also be issued in the form of proposed regulations and expire within three years of their issuance.  
I.R.C. § 7805(e)(CCH 2016). All published proposed and temporary regulations must be submitted to 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on the impact that 
such regulations will have on small business.  The Treasury must consider comments from the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and discuss any response to such 
comments in the preamble to final regulations.  I.R.C. § 7805(f)(CCH 2016). 
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notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.19  
This distinction has been criticized by several commentators and 
discounted by the courts.20  Congress exhibited a modicum of concern with 
this practice and expressly required the Treasury to comply with the 
provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act regardless of whether the 
regulations are legislative or interpretative.21  Moreover, as the tax law 
became more complex, particularly after the enactment of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, the Treasury came to rely on the issuance of temporary 
regulations which are binding upon taxpayers without any opportunity for 
pre-promulgation comment by interested parties.22  Congress took notice 
and enacted I.R.C. section 7805(e) in 1988 mandating that temporary 
regulations be issued contemporaneously with a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking and that such temporary regulations expire within three 
years.23  
The I.R.S. regularly engages in informal rulemaking through the 
issuance of revenue rulings and notices, neither of which are subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act.24  Revenue rulings are official, published 
 
19. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1158, n.16 (citing a study that found, in 232 regulatory 
projects studied, the notice and comment requirement was explicitly disclaimed in almost 92 percent of 
such projects).  
20. See e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–58 
(2011) (applying the same standard of deference to regulations issued under a general grant of authority 
that is applied to other regulations); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984) (stating that oftentimes legislative delegations are implicit); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. 
Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2008)(holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. 
§ 7805 have the force of law); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s 
(Lack of)Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1760–73) (2007); S8ee also ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on 
Judicial Deference [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report], 57 TAX LAW. 717 (2004).  
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2016). 
22. See Michael Asimov, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 
44 TAX LAW. 343, 343 (1991). See also Hickman, supra note 15, at 1160. In a study conducted by 
Professor Hickman, the Treasury frequently asserted that the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act did not apply to regulations, whether temporary or final, due to the good cause 
exception.  See Hickman, supra note 20, at 1749–51. Treasury’s invocation of the good cause exception 
has been met with skepticism.  See id. at 1782–86. 
23. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6232(a), 102 
Stat. 3342, 3734–35 (1988) (codified at I.R.C. § 7805(e)).  Recently, the Treasury issued temporary and 
proposed regulations to hinder inversion and post-inversion transactions pursuant to which a domestic 
corporation relocates its domicile in a low tax jurisdiction but maintains significant operations in the 
country of its former domicile.  See generally Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7T; 1,367(a)-3T; 1.367(b)-
4T; 1.956-2T;1,7701(l)-4T;1.7874-1T-4T; 1.7874-6T-12T, 81 Fed. Reg. 20857 (April 8, 2016).  The 
issuance of these regulations reportedly scuttled the pending Pfizer-Allergan merger, as well as other 
pending transactions.  See Katie Thomas & Chad Bray, Pfizer Weighs Split as Allergan Deal Collapses, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2016, at B1; Domenic Chopping & Ben Tita, Tax Inversion Rules Complicate 
Crane Deal, WALL ST. J., April 28, 2016, at B3(reporting that the new rules could derail a merger 
between Terex Corp. and Konecranes Oyj).  
24. The I.R.S. issues guidance in a number of forms including Revenue Procedures, Private 
Letter Rulings, and Technical Advice Memoranda.  A discussion of other forms of guidance is beyond 
1 - MELONE MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2017  11:08 AM 
Winter 2017] LIGHT ON THE MAYO 155 
interpretations of the tax law applicable to a particular set of facts and are 
designed to both promote the uniform application of the tax laws and to 
assist in taxpayers’ compliance with such laws.25  As explicitly noted in the 
weekly Internal Revenue Bulletins in which the rulings are published, 
rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations although they may be 
used as precedent by taxpayers. Rulings are designed to apply the law to a 
specific set of facts and, to that extent, can be fairly described as 
interpretative.  Notices often are used to provide guidance pending the 
issuance of a ruling or proposed regulations and frequently contain 
substantive interpretations of the tax law.26  Notices, in benign form, 
provide taxpayers with much needed guidance pending the conclusion of 
formal rulemaking.  However, they also have been used to advance 
controversial positions without any opportunity for public comment.  
Notice 2008-83 is a particularly good example of such use.   
Congress has long restricted the ability of corporate acquirers to 
utilize the net operating losses of acquisition targets.27  Under current law, 
if a corporate ownership change, as defined by the statute, occurs then 
I.R.C. section 382(a) limits the amount of the taxable income for any post-
change taxable year that may be offset by pre-change losses.28  
 
the scope of this article.  See Internal Revenue Service, Understanding IRS Guidance-A Brief Primer, 
available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer. 
25. See Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 C.B.1 (Jan. 2003); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, 814–
15 (Jan. 1989).  
26. See Internal Revenue Service, Understanding IRS Guidance-A Brief Primer, supra note 24. 
The status of Notices relative to Revenue Rulings with respect to the deference that a court will afford 
them is not clear.  Compare Constantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 980–81 (6th Cir. 1994)(stating that 
Revenue Rulings are entitled to greater deference) with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 78, 
99 (1993)(stating that Revenue Rulings and Notices are entitled to equal deference).  In some cases a 
Notice will expressly state that it may be relied upon by taxpayers as if it were a Revenue Ruling.  See 
e.g., Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422 (July 1989).  
27. Congress attempted to restrict the ability of taxpayers to traffic net operating losses over 70 
years ago.  Section 129 of the Revenue Act of 1943 denied certain tax benefits, including deductions, if, 
among other transactions, any person acquired control of a corporation and the principal purpose of 
such acquisition was the evasion or avoidance of federal income tax. Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 
78-235, § 129, 58 Stat. 21, 47 (1944). 
28. The I.R.C. § 382 limitation is equal to the value of the loss corporation multiplied by the 
long-term tax-exempt rate. I.R.C. § 382(b)(1)(CCH 2016).  The long-term tax–exempt rate is the 
highest of the adjusted Federal long-term rates in effect during the three month period ending in the 
calendar month in which the ownership change occurs adjusted for differences between long-term 
taxable and tax exempt rates.  I.R.C. § 382(f)(CCH 2016).  The Federal long-term rate is a rate 
published monthly by the I.R.S. that is determined by the average market yield on outstanding 
marketable obligations of the United States with maturities in excess of nine years.  See I.R.S. § 
1274(d)(1)(CCH 2016).  A business continuity requirement is also imposed under § 382.  In the event 
that the business enterprise of the old loss corporation is not continued at all times during the two year 
period beginning on the date of the ownership change, the § 382 limitation is zero.  I.R.C. § 
382(c)(1)(CCH 2016).  An ownership change occurs in one of two ways.  First, an ownership change 
occurs if the percentage of stock owned by one or more five percent shareholders increases by more 
than fifty percentage points over the lowest percentage held by such shareholders during a three year 
testing period. I.R.C. §§ 382(g); 382(i)(1); 382(k)(7)(CCH 2016).  Changes in the percentage ownership 
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Consequently, once the statutory threshold change in ownership occurs, net 
operating losses that arose prior to the ownership change are available to 
offset only a limited amount of taxable income in any taxable year. If the 
corporation has net unrealized built-in losses in its assets on the date of the 
ownership change then the losses subsequently recognized on those assets 
during the five year period following the ownership change date are subject 
to the same limitations as if such recognized losses were pre-change net 
operating losses.29  In effect, the I.R.C. section 382 limitation will apply to 
losses that would have been included in the net operating losses subject to 
I.R.C. section 382 had they been recognized prior to the ownership change.  
Notice 2008-83 was released on September 30, 2008 and its operative 
provision interpreted the statutory built-in loss provision as it applied to 
banks as follows: 
For purposes of section 382(h), any deduction properly allowed 
after an ownership change (as defined in section 382(g)) to a bank 
with respect to losses on loans or bad debts (including any 
deduction for a reasonable reserve for bad debts) shall not be 
treated as a built-in loss or a deduction that is attributable to 
periods before the change date.30 
 
This notice was issued in the midst of the financial crisis and mitigated the 
effect of the statutory rules on the acquirers of failing banks by overriding 
the statutory stricture that bad debt deductions, after an ownership change, 
were presumptively net recognized built-in losses unless the corporation 
carried its burden of proof to show otherwise.31  The notice was 
 
of five percent shareholders are termed “owner shifts.”  I.R.C. § 382(g)(2)(CCH 2016).  Alternatively, 
an ownership change occurs due to certain tax-free reorganizations that result in a more that fifty 
percentage point increase in the stock held by five percent or more shareholders over the lowest 
percentage of stock held by such shareholders during a three year testing period.  I.R.C. §§ 382(g); 
382(i)(1); 382(k)(7)(CCH 2016).  These transactions are termed “equity structure shifts.”  I.R.C. § 
383(g)(3)(2016). 
29. I.R.C. §§ 382(h)(1)(B); 382(h)(7)(CCH 2016).  A net unrealized built-in loss is the excess of 
the adjusted tax basis of the assets of the corporation over the fair market value of such assets on the 
change date.  I.R.C. § 382(h)(3)(A)(i)(CCH 2016).  Any deduction which is properly taken into account 
during the five year recognition period is treated as a recognized built-in loss if such deduction is 
attributable to the periods before the change date.  I.R.C. § 382(h)(6)(B)(CCH 2016).  Therefore, 
depreciation, amortization, and bad debt deductions, may be treated as recognized built-in losses to the 
extent that such depreciation or amortization is attributable to assets whose tax basis exceeded their fair 
market value on the change date or to the extent that a bad debt deduction is taken on a receivable that 
had already gone bad as of the change date.  The statute provides a de minimis rule that ignores 
unrealized built-in losses if such losses are minimal.  I.R.C. § 382(h)(3)(B)(CCH 2016).  Special rules 
apply in the event that the corporation has net unrealized built-in gains, as opposed to losses, on the date 
of the ownership change.  See I.R.C. § 382(h)(1)(A)(CCH 2016). 
30. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B 905.  
31. Notice 2008-83 was a major factor in both the acquisition of Wachovia Bank by Well Fargo 
and the acquisition of National City Bank by PNC Financial.  See Eric Dash & Jonathan D. Glater, 
Citigroup Says Judge’s Order Suspends Wachovia Deal, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 5, 2008, at A35; Eric Dash, 
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immediately criticized as a bailout for the banking industry.32  As one 
prominent Wall Street tax authority observed “[i]t couldn’t be clearer if 
they had taken out an ad.”33  Senators Schumer of New York and Grassley 
of Iowa publicly questioned the propriety of the notice and the latter 
requested an internal Treasury review of the circumstances surrounding its 
issuance.34  Congress overturned the notice with the passage of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, albeit prospectively.35  
Unfortunately, taxpayers to whom the notice did not apply would have 
encountered an insurmountable obstacle in challenging the legality of the 
notice—standing.36  Had the I.R.S.’s position been subjected to public 
 
PNC Gets National City in Latest Bank Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 24, 2008 at A4; See also ANDREW 
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (Penguin Books 2011) (reporting on effect that Notice 2008-83 had on 
the Wachovia acquisition); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REP. (2011) 
(reporting that, according to Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. chairwoman Sheila Bair, Notice 2008-83 
was a significant factor in the Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia). The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission was created by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5, 
123 Stat. 1617, 1625–31 (2009), to examine the causes of the 2008 financial crisis. 
32. See e.g., Jesse Drucker, Obscure Tax Breaks Increase the Cost of Financial Rescue, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008, at A3; Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks: With Attention on Bailout 
Debate, Treasury Made Change to Tax Policy, WASH. POST Nov. 10, 2008, at A01 (describing the 
reaction of several tax lawyers to the Notice). 
33. Joe Nocera, So When Will Banks Give Loans?, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 25, 2008, at B1 (quoting 
Robert Willens). 
34. Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Seeks Answers from IRS, Treasury on 
Tax Code Change that Subsidizes Bank Acquisitions (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://schumer. 
senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/record.cfm?id=304737; Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, 
Ranking Member, United States Committee on Finance, Grassley Seeks Inspector General Review of 
Treasury Bank Merger Move (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://finance/senate.gov/pressGpress/ 
2008/prg111408c.pdf.  The Treasury’s inspector general admitted that a legitimate argument could be 
made that the I.R.S. exceeded its authority in issuing the notice.  See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REP., supra note 31, at 371.  
35. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 Stat. 115, 342–43 (2009).  Section 1261(a) of the legislation 
stated Congress’ findings as follows: 
The delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury under section 382(m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does not authorize the Secretary to provide exemptions or 
special rules that are restricted to particular industries or classes of taxpayers. 
Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is inconsistent with the congressional intent in 
enacting such section 382(m). 
The legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is doubtful. Id. 
The legislation applied only to transactions that occurred after January 16, 2009.  Id.  Moreover, 
the notice would remain in effect for ownership changes that occurred pursuant to contracts and certain 
written agreements that were entered into on or before January 16, 2009. Id.   
36. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 478–89 (1923) (explaining that federal taxpayer 
standing jurisprudence had its genesis in the 1923. In that case, a taxpayer alleged that federal 
expenditures under a statute increased her tax bill in violation of due process and the Court denied the 
taxpayer standing because the effect of the expenditures on her federal tax liability was “too remote, 
fluctuating, and uncertain” and that “her interest in moneys of the Treasury” was “shared with millions 
of others”); Id. at 487 (illustrating that according to the Court, federal judicial power can be invoked by 
a party upon a showing “not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained some direct injury 
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with 
people generally"); Id. at 488 (explaining that the Court has been similarly unreceptive to suits brought 
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comment the public outcry could very well have prompted Congress to take 
action before, not after, its provisions became applicable to any bank 
acquisitions.  
The Treasury’s cavalier approach to rulemaking came with a price.  
For decades it was unclear whether Treasury regulations issued after notice 
and comment were entitled to the deference enjoyed by regulations issued 
by other agencies or whether such regulations were entitled to some lesser 
degree of deference.  
 
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO TREASURY REGULATIONS 
 
Treasury regulations have enjoyed varying level of judicial deference.  
The notion that tax regulations should be treated differently than other 
types of regulations by the courts had many proponents.  Calls for such tax 
exceptionalism were rooted in both Treasury practice and in the ostensible 
peculiarities of the tax law.  The Court’s landmark decision, over three 
decades ago, regarding deference to agency action sowed confusion as to 
whether that decision applied to all Treasury regulations—a confusion that 




Judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes is long-
standing and, at least initially, had prudential roots.  In Skidmore v, Swift & 
Co., the Court acknowledged the limitations, in terms of both resources and 
expertise, on the judicial branch, that place agencies in a favored position 
to interpret congressional enactments.37  Under Skidmore, the deference 
that an agency’s actions warrants depends upon the thoroughness of the 
 
by members of Congress that allege an institutional injury but have allowed allegations of personal 
injury to proceed).  See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818–19 (1997); Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 514–22 (1969).  See also Shays v. FEC, 414 F. 3d 76, 88–90 (D.C. Cir. 2005); U.S. 
House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2008)(concluding that 
legislators may have standing to challenge executive action in the absence of a particularized individual 
harm if they have undertaken the challenge in a representational capacity. In a recent federal district 
court case a committee of the House of Representatives had standing to enforce a subpoena issued by 
the committee to a member of the executive branch).  See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 
(1983) (stating, in dicta, that “. . . Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when 
an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute agrees with plaintiffs that 
the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional"); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) 
(highlighting the case that struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, the Bipartisan Litigation Advisory 
Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives petitioned to intervene to defend the statute as an 
interested party after being notified by the Attorney General that the Department of Justice would not 
defend the statute’s constitutionality.  The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether BLAG had 
standing its own right but Justices Alito and Thomas believed that BLAG did have standing to defend 
the statute and would maintain the standing of a member of Congress to defend the constitutionality of 
any statute provided that the member has the institutional imprimatur to do so); Id. at 2686, 2688. 
37. 323 U.S. 134, 138–40 (1944).  
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agency’s deliberations, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and other factors which provide the 
agency with the power to persuade.38  Skidmore deference is vague and 
offers judges tremendous flexibility in the degree to which they choose to 
pay respect to agency decisions.  Justice Scalia believed that Skidmore 
deference was no deference at all.39  
In 1979, the Court applied a multi-factor test to determine whether 
Treasury regulations issued under the general authority of I.R.C. section 
7805(a) were a permissible interpretation of a statute.40  Under this test—
the so called National Muffler test—the Court examined whether the 
regulations in question were a contemporaneous construction of the statute 
promulgated with the awareness of congressional intent; the length of time 
that the regulations were in effect; the degree of reliance placed on the 
regulations by affected parties; the consistency of the agency’s position; 
and the degree of scrutiny given the regulations by Congress during 
subsequent re-enactments of the statute.41  The Court later applied this test 
in two cases decided not long after its National Muffler decision and, in 
both cases, noted that less deference is owed to Treasury interpretations 




The seminal case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. was decided in 1984 and has sowed confusion for the 
tax bar for three decades.43  Under Chevron, if the statute that is the subject 
of the agency action does not directly address the precise question at issue 
then a very deferential standard of review is applied to agency action that 
had been subject to notice and comment.44  Under that standard, agency 
action will not be disturbed unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.45  This test, the lapidary 
Chevron two-step test, is more deferential than the National Muffler test in 
several respects.  For example, under Chevron, whether the agency’s action 
is consistent with its previous position on the matter at hand and whether 
the regulation had been issued contemporaneously with the statute are not 
 
38. Id. at 140.  
39. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
40. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
41. Id. at 477. 
42. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United 
States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981). 
43. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
44. Id. at 842–43.  
45. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. at 277. 
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relevant to the level of deference due the agency.46  Moreover, the Court 
has held that Chevron deference is owed to regulations that are contrary to 
previous judicial holdings regarding the meaning of statutory terms.47   
Chevron mandated deference to agency interpretations when its 
conditions were met and was premised, like Skidmore, on prudential 
grounds.  The modern administrative state demands that agencies possess 
specialized knowledge beyond the “ordinary knowledge” possessed by the 
courts.48  Justice Ginsburg reiterated the prudential rationale for judicial 
deference to agency action in a more recent case.  “The expert agency is 
surely better equipped to do the job than individual judges issuing ad hoc, 
case by case injunctions.  Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and 
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this 
order.”49  
In addition to prudential concerns, Chevron also rested on the notion 
of congressional intent and the concomitant political accountability that 
follows.50  Judicial deference to agency action is warranted because “[t]he 
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . 
. . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of 
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”51  Thus, 
deference was owed to an agency regardless of whether Congress explicitly 
delegated interpretative power to the agency or whether that delegation was 
implicit.  The two rationales for deference, expertise and political 
accountability, are not always compatible with each other.  Technocratic 
expertise, dispassionately wielded, appears to rest uncomfortably with 
political accountability and the horse trading that comes with such 
accountability.  It stands to reason that political considerations often will 
countermand technical considerations—a point made by critics of 
administrative power.  Such critics, including the House of 
Representatives, question the political legitimacy of agency actions because 
 
46. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 
(2005) (stating that lack of consistency does not undermine the case for deference); Cent. Laborers’ 
Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 748 (2004) (deferring to a regulation that upset a longstanding 
agency position to the contrary); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (applying Chevron 
deference to a regulations issued approximately a century after the enactment of the statute).  A recent 
study of the application of Chevron at the Circuit Court level found that agencies prevail in disputes at a 
significantly higher rate than they do when the courts review an issue de novo or apply a less deferential 
standard of review.  See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts (July 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2808848. 
47. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 982.  
48. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844.  
49. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011). 
50. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.  
51. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843.  
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of the inordinate influence that the regulated constituency often exerts over 
the regulator.52 
Ostensibly, Chevron has a constitutional dimension in that fealty to 
congressional intent pays respect to separation of powers and to the notion 
that policy debates are best resolved by the political branches.  For several 
reasons, however, the link between the Constitution and Chevron should be 
considered tenuous at best.  First, if deference is constitutionally mandated 
then it begs the question of why it took so long for the Court to say so.  
Second, deference to agency interpretations invites sweeping delegations of 
authority from Congress to agencies, delegations which themselves may 
either violate separation of powers principles or come close to doing so.53  
Third, to underpin Chevron on the Constitution putatively renders any 
explicit statutory provision that rejects or limits judicial deference, 
including certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
unconstitutional.54  Fourth, Chevron itself, in the resolution of its step one, 
 
52. The House of Representatives passed the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, 
H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016) which would require a de novo judicial review of all relevant questions 
of law and agency rules.  There are several reasons for the oft-held perception of industry dominance 
over regulators including resource disparities, political influence, informational disparities, and the 
proverbial revolving door between agencies and their regulated constituents.  See David J. Arkush, 
Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1458, 1473-75 (2013).   
53. Congress cannot delegate its Article I legislative powers.  See Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 
692 (1892).  Broad delegations of regulatory authority to agencies call into question whether a 
delegation is so broad that it constitutes an impermissible delegation by Congress of its legislative 
authority.  The Court has applied an “intelligible principle” test to determine whether a congressional 
delegation is too broad.  In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989), the Court 
succinctly described this test.  
Applying this "intelligible principle" test to congressional delegations, our 
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly 
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress 
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives . . . .  Accordingly, this Court has deemed it "constitutionally sufficient" if 
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, 
and the boundaries of this delegated authority.  
The Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of actions committed to agency 
discretion by law.  See 5 U.S.C. § 701(2) (2016).  The Court has held that this exception is to be 
construed narrowly, applicable in the rare instances where the statutory terms are so broad that there is 
no law to apply.  See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410–11 (1971).  
The non-delegation doctrine set forth in Mistretta appears to be in tension with the “no law to apply” 
standard set forth in Overton Park.  See Viktoria Lovei, Revealing the True Definition of APA § 
701(a)(2) by Reconciling “No Law to Apply” with the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1047 (2006).  
54. For example, the Freedom of Information Act mandates a de novo review of government 
actions to withhold records from the public.  See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, 
and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060 (2014).  The Administrative Procedure Act provides a number of rules 
regarding judicial review of agency rules and actions, including a provision that requires a court to 
decide all relevant questions of law and to interpret statutory provisions and the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of agency action.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2016).  If Chevron was constitutionally 
required then any conflict it has created with provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act is not 
problematic.  However, critics of Chevron do not make this assertion and instead explain away any 
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does not remove the judiciary from policy debates and instead often 
requires the judiciary to immerse itself in policy matters.  Whether or not 
Congress has spoken clearly on an issue often turns on the judiciary’s 
evaluation of a statute’s underlying policy or policies.55  Finally, statutes 
contain gaps for a number of reasons not all of which reflect a 
congressional desire to punt the issues to an agency.56  In such 
circumstances Chevron deference represents nothing more than the ceding 
of power by the judicial branch to the executive branch for prudential 
reasons.57  
 
seeming conflict between Chevron and the Administrative Procedure Act on policy grounds or, 
alternatively, on the notion that Congress’s delegation of authority to an agency evidences a 
congressional intent for the courts to defer to an agency.  This latter explanation is problematic because 
the Administrative Procedure Act cannot be overridden by another statute unless the other statute does 
so expressly.  See 5 U.S.C. § 559(2016).  See generally Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 31 VA. TAX REV. 813, 816–22 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2585-91 (2006); John F. 
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–203 (1998). Note 
that the language of § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act also appears to conflict with the 
deference that the courts provide to agency interpretations of their own regulations pursuant to the 
standards set forth in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1991).  Under Auer, an agency’s interpretation of 
an ambiguous regulation is given controlling weight unless such interpretation is inconsistent with the 
regulation or statute or is plainly erroneous.  Id. at 461.  Auer deference is not due an agency if its 
interpretation is not the result of fair and considered judgment, conflicts with a prior interpretation, or 
represents a convenient litigating position or a post-hoc rationalization.  See Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (citations omitted).  The Court, in United States v. 
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999), stated that it saw no incongruity between a court’s de novo 
review of both an agency’s determination of facts and its application of the law to those facts and a 
court’s deference to an agency’s interpretation of the law.  Id. at 391.  In a recent case, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the Department of Education’s interpretation of its regulations under Title IX of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 that such regulations required schools to treat transgender students consistent with 
their gender identity.  The Department’s interpretation—promulgated in an opinion letter issued by its 
Office of Civil Rights—was entitled to deference under Auer.  See Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 
2016 U.S. APP. LEXIS 7026 (4th Cir. 2016).  An interesting issue is whether deference is appropriate for 
agency claims of preemption.  If Chevron indeed is firmly rooted in the separation of powers then 
preemption claims would implicate a conflict between the two structural pillars of the Constitution, 
separation of powers and federalism. For an interesting discussion of deference in such circumstances 
see William W. Buzbee, Does the Earth Belong to the Living? Property and Environmental Law 
Perspectives on the Rights of Future Generations: Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory 
Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1521 
(2009).  The House of Representatives passed a bill in 2016 that would require a court to undertake a de 
novo review of agency rules.  See supra note 52. 
55. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue in the context of 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding the availability of tax credits to purchasers of health 
insurance on the Federal Exchange established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.   
56. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
57. Two scholars have asserted that the President has the constitutional authority to gap-fill 
statutory provisions.  See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 
YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006).  If so, then Chevron need not be supported on congressional delegation 
grounds. Moreover, the refusal to invoke Chevron for “extraordinary” issues that belie Congress’s 
intent to delegate could not be justified because the executive branch’s authority is not predicated on 
such intent.  See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chevron in the context of 
“extraordinary” issues.  
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Scholars have debated whether the two steps of the Chevron test are 
redundant. Stephenson and Vermeule assert that “the single question is 
whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory 
interpretation; the two Chevron steps both ask the question, just in different 
ways.  As a result, the two steps are mutually convertible.”58  To be sure, an 
agency interpretation that is contrary to Congress’s express intent cannot be 
considered a reasonable interpretation.  However, in such cases there is one 
and only one interpretation that is reasonable.  The counterargument to 
Stephenson and Vermuele was compelling made by Richard Re who 
asserted that Chevron step one provides the answer to the question of 
whether Congress left only one permissible interpretation of a statute or 
more than one.59  If, under Chevron step one, a genuine statutory ambiguity 
exists, then Chevron step two defers to any number of interpretations, so 
long as they are reasonable.60  
In addition to the question of whether the two Chevron steps should be 
collapsed into one step, a question whose answer had significant 
implications for tax regulations persisted concerning Chevron’s 
applicability to implicit delegations of authority.  Five years prior to the 
Chevron decision, National Muffler set forth the standard by which courts 
were to determine whether and to what extent to defer to Treasury 
regulations issued under I.R.C. section 7805(a).61  After Chevron, the 
continuing vitality of the National Muffler standard was unclear due to a 
distinction between explicit and implicit delegations seemingly made by 
Chevron itself.    
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.  
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary 
to the statute.  Sometimes the legislative delegation to an 
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than 
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
 
58. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 
597, 599 (2009).  
59. Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 610–16 (2014).  
60. Id.  Recasting Chevron step one as an inquiry into whether Congress mandated a particular 
interpretation avoids the confusion that the Court has created in assessing whether Congress intended to 
delegate authority over a particularly important issue.  In reality, such an inquiry resolves Chevron step 
one—the Congress had one particular result in mind and, therefore, no ambiguity existed.  The Court’s 
approach has been to find a statutory ambiguity, determine that the issue is too important for Congress 
to have delegated to an agency, and then proceed to find that there is a clear congressional intent on the 
matter after all.  As discussed later in this article, this is precisely what the Court did in King v. Burwell.  
See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
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construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.62 
Some commentators, including the American Bar Association, believed 
that Chevron set forth two separate step twos—an arbitrary, capricious, 
manifestly contrary to the statute test for regulations promulgated under 
explicit congressional delegations of authority and a less deferential 
reasonable interpretation standard for regulations promulgated under 
implicit congressional delegations of authority.63  Consequently, the 
deference afforded to regulations issued pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805(a) 
by National Muffler is appropriate after Chevron.64  United States v. Mead 
is a case well known for the Court’s post-Chevron application of the less 
deferential Skidmore standard of review to informal rules, in this case a 
customs service ruling.65  Thus, the Court made explicit that the Skidmore 
standard survived Chevron at least with respect to informal rule making.66 
Mead is also interpreted by some, but not all, commentators as reinforcing 
the distinction made by Chevron between the level of deference to be given 
regulations issued pursuant to explicit and implicit delegations of 
authority.67  
If indeed the Chevron Court intended to create Step 2A, applicable to 
regulations issued under explicit delegations, and Step 2B, applicable to 
regulations issued under implicit delegations, then it left no guidance as to 
the application of the standards it set forth.  For example, whether a 
delegation is explicit or implicit often is not clear. Many specific statutory 
provisions are extremely complex, implicate a number of issues, and 
contain a broad delegation of authority to issue regulations without limiting 
that authority to any specific provision or provisions in the statute in 
 
62. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843–44.  
63. See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light of 
National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW 480, 495 (2008); ABA Task 
Force Report, supra note 20, at 739.  
64. Id. at 794. 
65. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232–36; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty, 529 
U.S. 576, 587 (2000)(stating that Skidmore deference is applicable to informal agency actions such as 
opinion letters, manuals, guidelines, and policy statements); Nelson v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 662, 665 (8th 
Cir. 2009)(applying Skidmore deference to revenue rulings); Kornman & Assoc., Inc., v. United States, 
527 F.3d 443, 452–57 (5th Cir. 2008)(concluding that Revenue Rulings are entitled to Skidmore 
deference); but see Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 
2008) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring)(concluding that Chevron deference was appropriate for a Revenue 
Procedure).  The Department of Justice has indicated that it will not argue for the application of 
Chevron deference to Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures.  See infra note 87 and accompanying 
text.   
66. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35.  
67. See Berg, supra note 63, at 494–95; ABA Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 739.  
However, Mead contains language that supports the opposite conclusion. See Leandra Lederman, The 
Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 BOSTON. U. L. REV. 643, 
660–61 (2012).  
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question.68  In many respects, such authority resembles the authority 
granted by I.R.C. section 7805(a).  In addition, the questions of how, and to 
what degree, the reasonableness standard is less deferential that the 
arbitrary, capricious, manifestly contrary to the statute standard were not 
answered.  Is it even possible that an administrative interpretation can be 
unreasonable if such interpretation is not arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute?  Most likely, the Court in both Chevron 
and Mead used such terms interchangeably and simply was making clear 
that both explicit and implicit delegations of regulatory authority by 
Congress trigger coterminous levels of deference.  In my opinion, the Court 
put this issue to rest in 2011.69  
After Chevron, the Court continued to apply the National Muffler test 
to Treasury regulations issued under I.R.C. section 7805, albeit somewhat 
inconsistently and without clear guidance on either the effect that Chevron 
had on the applicability of this test or on how this test differed from 
Chevron’s two step standard.70  As a result, confusion and contradiction 
emanated from the lower courts and the Tax Court as to whether Chevron 
replaced National Muffler, whether they are in fact similar, and when to 
apply one standard versus the other.71  Critics of the application of Chevron 
to tax regulations asserted a sort of tax exceptionalism pursuant to which a 
lesser standard of deference was justified for tax regulations.  Such 
exceptionalism was warranted because of the inherent advantages enjoyed 
by the I.R.S. over taxpayers, the severity of tax penalties, the sweeping 
reach of the revenue collection function, and the particular importance of 
agency expertise in administering statutes with the complexity of the tax 
code.72 Moreover, unlike other agencies, Treasury actions often are 
 
68. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.  
69. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
70. See Berg, supra note 63, at 497; Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax 
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1579–86 (2006). 
71. Berg, supra note 63, at 500–16 (discussing several Circuit Court cases and Tax Court cases).  
In one case, the Tax Court stated that the National Muffler standard “had not been changed by Chevron, 
but has merely been restated in a practical two-part test with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of 
legislative history and the degree of deference to be accorded to a regulation.”  Cent. Pa. Savings Ass’n 
& Subs. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995).  According to the Court, the National Muffler and 
Chevron standards are not similar.  See infra note 78. 
72. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 723–25.  The idea of tax exceptionalism is not 
universally held.  See Hickman, supra note 70, at 1592–98.  The notion that tax law is somehow 
exceptional and that standards of deference should be adjusted accordingly is, in part, a result of the silo 
effect—the propensity of agencies to develop their own bureaucratic eccentricities.  The Treasury itself 
has practiced its own brand of tax exceptionalism and, therefore, it is not surprising that the tax bar has 
sought to counter with its own call for tax exceptionalism.  See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying 
text; Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 510–
26 (2011).  
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insulated from taxpayer challenge due to the inability of taxpayers to 




In 2011 the Court decided Mayo Foundation for Medical Education 
and Research v. United States and held that the Chevron standard applied 
to all Treasury regulations issued after notice and comment.74  Rejecting 
any notions of tax exceptionalism, the Court acknowledged that the 
administrative landscape had changed over the years and that no special 
rules were warranted for tax regulations.75  Accordingly, tax regulations are 
entitled to Chevron deference regardless of their source of authority.76  
Mayo presented the question of whether physicians who serve as 
medical residents were entitled to a student exemption from certain federal 
payroll taxes. The I.R.S. promulgated a regulation pursuant to the general 
grant of authority under I.R.C. section 7805 that denied medical residents 
an exemption from the applicable payroll taxes. The Court upheld the 
 
73. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of taxpayers standing.  The  
Anti-Injunction Act prohibits any “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any 
tax . . . in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 
assessed.”  I.R.C. § 7421(a)(CCH 2016).  In effect, § 7421 requires that taxpayers resolve their tax 
disputes in a suit for refund and provides legislative notice of the “[g]overnment’s need to assess and 
collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference.”  
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004).  This statute is a significant burden if the regulations have a 
particularly large negative impact on pending transactions, such as the recently issued tax inversion 
rules. There are several exceptions to the statute’s prohibition including the ability of a federal district 
court to issue an injunction to prevent irreparable harm to the property rights of others in the context of 
a levy or sale of property by the I.R.S.  See I.R.C. § 7426(b)(CCH 2016).  Moreover, third parties are 
expressly provided standing to vindicate an interest in property that has been wrongfully levied.  I.R.C. 
§ 7426(a)(CCH 2016).  Exceptions to the statute are also provided for collection activities undertaken in 
certain cases that involve innocent-spouse relief or undertaken during the pendency of a Tax Court 
proceeding challenging federal liens and levies.  See I.R.C. §§ 6015(e)(1)(B)(2); 6330(e)(CCH 2016).  
The Court has held that proceedings whose success would have the effect of increasing tax revenue are 
not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.  Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. at 102–12.  See also E. Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1283–85 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  The Court also has recognized two 
common law exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. First, a pre-enforcement challenge will be 
countenanced if the government could not prevail under any circumstances and the taxpayer would 
suffer irreparable harm from enforcement action.  See Enoch v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 
370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).  Second, a preenforcement action is permitted if, under the circumstances, no 
other legal remedy is available.  See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378, 380–81 (1984). 
Whether an exaction is a tax, subject to the Anti-Injunction Act, or a penalty was at issue in the Court’s 
landmark decision upholding the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
See infra note 107.  The D.C. Circuit recently held that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded a taxpayer 
challenge to certain income reporting requirements imposed on U.S. banks by Treasury regulations.  
See Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U. S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied 
2016 U.S. LEXIS 3683 (June 6, 2016). 
74. 562 U.S. 44 (2011). 
75. Id. at 56–57.  
76. Id. at 57–58.  
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regulation under the Chevron standard.77  The Court forcefully rejected the 
notion that tax regulations are somehow entitled to less deference than the 
regulatory action of other agencies.  
. . . Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying 
a less deferential standard of review to Treasury 
Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any 
other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are 
not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative 
review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have 
expressly “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a 
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative 
action” . . . .  Filling in gaps in the Internal Revenue Code 
plainly requires the Treasury Department to make 
interpretive choices for statutory implementation at least 
as complex as the ones other agencies must make in 
administering their statutes . . . .  We see no reason why 
our review of tax regulations should not be guided by 
agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent 
as our review of other regulations.78  
The Court, in my opinion, also put to rest the belief that Chevron set forth 
two versions of its step two, one version applicable to regulations 
promulgated pursuant to explicit congressional delegations of authority and 
another version for regulations issued pursuant to implicit congressional 
delegations of authority.79  The Court appeared to consider the two 
formulations of step two as interchangeable.  After concluding that the 
statute’s ambiguity allowed it to proceed to step two of Chevron, the Court 
stated that “such an ambiguity would lead us inexorably to Chevron step 
two, under which we may not disturb an agency rule unless it is ‘[arbitrary 
or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.]’”80  The 
Court, after explaining at length why Chevron deference was appropriate in 
this case, then applied step two by inquiring whether the regulation in 
question was a ‘“reasonable interpretation”’ of the statute.81 
The Court’s opinion also called into question just what constitutes an 
explicit or implicit delegation of authority and whether such a distinction 
matters.  The Court stated that the regulation at issue in the case was issued 
“pursuant to the explicit authorization” set forth in I.R.C. section 7805(a) 
and that such “express congressional authorizations” indicate that Chevron 
 
77. Id. at 58–60.  
78. Id. at 55–56.  The Court also made clear the distinction between the Chevron and National 
Muffler standards and why the former is significantly more deferential than the latter. Id. at 54–55.  
79. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.  
80. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 53 (citations 
omitted). 
81. Id. at 58.  
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deference is warranted.  If indeed I.R.C. section 7805 provides explicit 
authorization for Treasury rule-making, then it is difficult to conceive of 
any Treasury regulation that would be issued under any authority other than 
explicit authority.  
However, in King v. Burwell the Court stated that if a statutory 
ambiguity constitutes any delegation of authority then it constitutes “an 
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory 
gaps.”82  Because Chevron deference is predicated on the existence of a 
statutory ambiguity, if one takes King v. Burwell at face value then all 
Chevron deference is reserved for regulations issued under implicit grants 
of congressional authority. Mayo and King v. Burwell are irreconcilable in 
this respect.  Under Mayo, all regulations, whether they are issued under 
the authority provided by I.R.C. section 7805 or under the authority of a 
substantive I.R.C. section, represent action taken pursuant to an explicit 
grant of authority from Congress.  In contrast, under King v. Burwell any 
agency authority to resolve a statutory ambiguity is a result of an implicit 
grant of authority to the agency by Congress.  The Court made clear in 
King that the intent of Congress is the determining factor in whether 
deference to an agency’s action is warranted.83  The inconsistency between 
Mayo and King v. Burwell in the Court’s categorization of authority 
indicates that whether regulatory authority is made explicit or implicit is 
not important.  
Chevron left a number of issues—tax and otherwise—unresolved and 
Mayo did not resolve all deference questions with respect to Treasury 
actions.84  For example, whether Chevron deference is predicated on the 
issuance of regulations after notice and comment is not clear.  Mayo hinted 
that notice and comment is a prerequisite for Chevron deference but did not 
say so categorically.  “The Department issued the full-time employee rule 
only after notice-and- comment procedures, . . . again a consideration 
identified in our precedents as a ‘significant’ sign that a rule merits 
Chevron deference.”85  Thus, whether temporary Treasury regulations are 
entitled to Chevron deference is unlikely and, if not, whether National 
 
82. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).  See infra note 129 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the Court’s decision that Chevron deference was not warranted in this case.  
83. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
84. Two scholars posed 14 questions that they believe Chevron left unanswered in addition to 
the basic question of whether there are certain subject matters for which deference is not appropriate. 
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 849–52 (2001).  
85. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 57–58 (citing Mead 
v. United States, 533 U.S. at 230–31, and Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 351 U.S. 158,173–
74 (2007)).  
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Muffler or Skidmore deference should apply is unclear.86  Informal actions, 
such as revenue rulings and notices appear to warrant, after Mead, 
Skidmore deference—an opinion that is shared by the government.  The 
Department of Justice has stated that it will not argue that Chevron 
deference applies to revenue rulings or revenue procedures.87   
After Mayo, the deference to which Treasury regulations issued after 
notice and comment are entitled no longer depends upon their source of 
authority.  Mayo, therefore, was a win for the Treasury because, assuming 
that Chevron step one is met, Chevron and not Skidmore, National Muffler, 
or some other less deferential test will be applied to test the validity of 
Treasury regulations. Whether this result is desirable as a policy matter 
depends on whether one believes in tax exceptionalism, whether Mayo will 
embolden the Treasury to exercise its interpretative authority more 
aggressively, and whether it will provide impetus for the Treasury to 




86 The Seventh Circuit, however, indicated that it would apply Chevron deference to temporary 
regulations, at least those that have been replaced by nearly identical final regulations issued after 
notice and comment.  
This temporary regulation, which was issued without notice and comment at the same 
time as an identical proposed regulation, purports to offer taxpayers guidance by 
resolving an open question and stating definitively that in the case of a disposition of 
property, an overstatement of basis can lead to an omission from gross income.  This 
temporary regulation has since been replaced by a nearly identical final regulation, issued 
after a notice and comment period. T.D. 9511 (eff. Dec. 14, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 78, 897.  
Because we find that Colony is not controlling, we need not reach this issue. However, 
we would have been inclined to grant the temporary regulation Chevron deference, just as 
we would be inclined to grant such deference to T.D. 9511.  We have previously given 
deference to interpretive Treasury regulations issued with notice-and-comment 
procedures, see Kikalos v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 190 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 
1999); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 979–84 (7th Cir. 
1998), and the Supreme Court has stated that the absence of notice-and-comment 
procedures is not dispositive to the finding of Chevron deference.  Barnhart v. Walton, 
535 U.S. 212, 222, 122 S. Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002).  
See Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011).  It is not clear whether proposed 
regulations are entitled to any deference whatsoever although the Court has indicated that such 
regulations are not so entitled. In rejecting the taxpayer’s reliance on proposed regulations the Court 
stated that “. . . we find these proposed regulations to be of little consequence given that they were 
nothing more than mere proposals.”  Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 453 n.13 (2003).  
87. See Marie Sapirie, DOJ Won’t Argue for Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings and 
Procedures, Official Says, 131 TAX NOTES 674 (May 16, 2011).  
88. See Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. 
TAX REV. 269, 275–78, 289–98 (2012)(setting forth the benefits of the Mayo decision but cautioning 
that Mayo, when combined with Brand X, Auer, and other doctrines could lead to Treasury overreach).  
See supra notes 46, 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brand X and Auer.  A recent study of 
the Circuit Courts’ application of Chevron found that Chevron is invoked somewhat less frequently in 
tax cases but, when invoked, the Treasury’s win rate is relatively high.  See Barnett & Walker, supra 
note 46, at 48, Table 2. 
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II.  MAYO DIMINISHED? THE EXTRAORDINARY ISSUE 
AND STATE FARM 
 
Two recent developments call into question whether Mayo has 
provided a veritable carte blanche to the Treasury to interpret the I.R.C.  
First, the Supreme Court, in the third of its trilogy of cases involving the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, refused to apply Chevron to 
the Treasury regulations at issue in that case.89 The Court’s rationale for its 
refusal to defer to the Treasury was not altogether convincing but the 
Court’s decision nonetheless could provide support for taxpayer assertions 
that deference to the Treasury is unwarranted. Second, another fundamental 
but different administrative law doctrine recently has appeared on the tax 
landscape—the State Farm doctrine.90  Two recent cases applied this 
doctrine to invalidate Treasury regulations.91  Perhaps it was inevitable that 
the Mayo Court’s refusal to provide special treatment for Treasury 
regulations would lead to the application of other administrative law 
doctrines that, up to that time, were ignored in the tax context.  Mayo may 
very well turn out to be a mixed blessing for the Treasury. 
 
A. King v. Burwell and the Extraordinary Issue  
 
On occasion, the Court seemingly interjects an extra step into the 
Chevron analysis. The Court proceeds to discover a statutory ambiguity but 
then inquires whether the ambiguity implicates an issue of such 
importance—an extraordinary case—that it is unlikely that Congress would 
have implicitly delegated authority to an agency to resolve the issue.  
Despite the Court’s rhetoric, what the Court appears to do in these cases is 
apply a more searching inquiry in resolving Chevron step one.  
For example, whether the FDA had the authority to regulate tobacco 
products was the issue before the Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.92  The Court, after twenty-three pages of explanation, 
 
89. See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.  The first in the trilogy of cases was Nat’l 
Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).  In that case, the Court upheld the statute’s 
requirement that individuals obtain health insurance coverage or face financial penalties.  The Court, 
despite holding that enactment of this provision did not fall within the Commerce Power, believed that 
it was within Congress’s power to tax and spend.  Id. at 2577.  In that same case the Court struck down, 
on federalism grounds, the parts of the legislation that expanded Medicaid coverage. Id. at 2606–07.  
The second case in the trilogy was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751(2014).  The 
Court held that, pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the statute’s requirement to provide 
certain contraceptive coverage could not be enforced against three closely held corporations. 
90. See infra notes 159-95 and accompanying text. 
91. See infra notes 196-295 and accompanying text. 
92. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
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concluded that Congress did not intend to authorize the FDA to regulate 
tobacco products.93 
Finally, our inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue is shaped, at least in some 
measure, by the nature of the question presented. Deference 
under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it 
administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity 
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency 
to fill in the statutory gaps.  See Chevron, 467 U. S., at 844. In 
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate 
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit 
delegation.94  
The Court went on to quote from a law review article written by Justice 
Breyer before he was confirmed to the Court. “A court may also ask 
whether the legal question is an important one. Congress is more likely to 
have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving 
interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily 
administration.”95 
As the Court exhaustively documented, Congress’s intent was clear. 
Therefore, there was no longer any ambiguity and whether or not the issue 
presented was extraordinary should have been irrelevant.  Step one of 
Chevron was not met and, as a consequence, step two is not applicable.  
The Court’s reasoning in the FDA case recently was parroted in the Court’s 
most recent ObamaCare decision, King v. Burwell.96  At issue in this case 
was whether federal tax credits are available to individual enrollees in the 
Federal Exchange.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
established the American Health Benefit Exchanges [hereinafter 
Exchanges], governmental or non-profit entities that, among other 
functions, serve as insurance marketplaces in which individuals have the 
ability to comparison shop for insurance products.97  Each state must create 
and operate an Exchange that offers insurance for purchase by individuals 
and employees of small employers.98  A state may opt out of creating and 
operating an Exchange in which case the Exchange will be established by 
 
93. Id. at 133–56. 
94. Id. at 159.  
95. Id. (quoting Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 370 (1986)). 
96. 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015). 
97. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1311, 124 Stat. at 173 
(codified at 41 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1)–(4)(2016)). 
98. Id., § 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(2016)). After 2016, states 
have the option of allowing large employers to participate in the Exchanges.  Id., § 1312(f)(2)(B), 124 
Stat, at 184 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032(2016)).  Under certain circumstances, a state may participate 
in a multi-state regional Exchange or establish subsidiary Exchanges to operate within a state.  Id., § 
1311(f), 124 Stat. at 179 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(2016)).  See also 45 C.F.R. § 155.140 (2013).   
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the federal government.99  Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have 
established Exchanges.100   
The Act added section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code.101  This 
provision, commonly referred to as the individual mandate, is designed to 
minimize adverse selection in light of the insurance market reforms that 
were part of the legislation.102  The individual mandate requires that an 
applicable individual maintain minimum essential coverage for herself and 
any dependents who are also applicable individuals each month beginning 
after 2013.103  Failure to maintain such coverage for one or more months 
results in the imposition of a shared responsibility payment, a penalty that 
is included with a taxpayer’s income tax return for the taxable year which 
includes the month that such failure occurred.104   
A significant number of individuals obtain health insurance through 
their employers, a delivery mechanism that had its genesis as a mechanism 
 
99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 18041 (2016)).  These Exchanges may be operated exclusively by the Department of Health 
and Human Services or in partnership with the state with authority over the operation of the Exchange 
residing within the Department of Health and Human Services.  See Bernadette Fernandez & Annie L. 
Mach, Health Insurance Exchanges Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
Cong. Res. Serv. 12-13  (Jan. 31, 2013).  Seven Exchanges operate under this model.  Four states 
operate federally supported Exchanges.  These Exchanges are operated by state authorities through the 
use of federal information technology infrastructure.  See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 
2016, http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/. 
100. See id.  
101. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§1501(b); 10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 244–
49,909–10 (2010)(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A (CCH 2016).  The penalty amount imposed 
by the statute was amended shortly thereafter by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §1002, 124 Stat.1029, 1032–33 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(CCH 
2016)).  This provision survived a constitutional challenge when the Court upheld it under Congress’s 
taxing power despite holding that its enactment exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  See supra note 89.  
102. Among the insurance market reforms instituted by the legislation are community rating and 
guarantee issue requirements.  Insurers may not price discriminate on any basis except age, family size, 
smoking, and geographic areas.  Consequently, insurers can neither deny coverage to those individuals 
with pre-existing medical conditions nor price their coverage to account for such pre-existing 
conditions. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §1201, 124 Stat. at 155 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-3(2016)).  Adverse selection refers to the propensity of those most in need of 
insurance to purchase it while those individuals with little or no perceived need of insurance—the 
young and healthy, for example—forego its purchase.  Adverse selection reduces the number of no or 
low claim customers needed by the insurers to keep premiums affordable.  
103. I.R.C. § 5000A(a)(CCH 2016).  The term “applicable individual” excludes individuals who 
qualify for statutorily defined religious conscience or health ministry exemptions, individuals who are 
not citizens or nationals of, or legal aliens present in, the United States, or who are incarcerated.  I.R.C. 
§ 5000A(d)(CCH 2016). Individuals whose required contribution exceeds eight percent of household 
income, very low income individuals, and members of Indian tribes are not subject to the penalty. 
I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)–(3)(CCH 2016).  
104. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1)–(2)(CCH 2016).  The requirement to maintain minimum essential 
coverage is variously met through, among other means, Medicare or Medicaid coverage, individual 
insurance policies, or eligible employer-sponsored group health plans or insurance coverage.  I.R.C. § 
5000A(f)(CCH 2016). 
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to avoid wage controls during World War II and that is aided and abetted 
by income tax subsidies,105 I.R.C. section 4980H was added by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act to prevent employers from free riding 
on the statute’s tax credits and subsidies by not offering adequate health 
insurance coverage to their employees.106  This provision imposes an 
exaction on certain employers if they either do not offer insurance coverage 
to their employees or offer coverage that is deemed inadequate under the 
statute.107  An assessable payment is imposed on employers with an 
average of fifty or more full time or full time equivalent employees if such 
employers fail to offer affordable minimum essential health care coverage 
to their full time employees and one or more such employees qualify for 
the tax credit or premium subsidies.108  In addition, an excise tax is 
imposed in the amount of $100 per day for each affected individual if the 
 
105. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 
and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
14389, 2009).  The system has been subject to much criticism by economists because, among other 
things, it provides greater subsidies to higher income individuals, masks the true cost of coverage to the 
insured resulting in the overconsumption of medical care, and distorts labor market mobility due to lack 
of portability.  See id. at 8–14. The portability issue has been addressed to a very limited extent by the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986), 
under which, in general, employers with twenty or more full time equivalent employees must offer 
medical coverage for a period of eigthteen months to an employee or covered family member after a 
qualifying event.  Among qualifying events are voluntary or involuntary termination of employment, 
divorce, death, and disability.  The employee must pay for the cost of coverage plus an allowable 
administrative fee.   
106. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1513, 10106(e), 124 Stat. at 253–56, 910–11 
(codified as amended in I.R.C. § 4980H (CCH 2016)).  See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the tax credit.  
107. I.R.C. § 4980H (CCH 2016).  A federal district upheld the constitutionality of the employer 
mandates but its decision was vacated by the Fourth Circuit due to the application of the Ant-Injunction 
Act, discussed at supra note 73.  See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va., 
2010), vacated, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011).  The Court later held that 
the individual mandate was a tax for constitutional purposes but that it was a penalty for purposes of the 
Anti-Injunction Act. Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2594.  In light of its holding in 
Sebelius, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit. 
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012). The Fourth Circuit then upheld the constitutionality of 
the employer mandate.  Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir., 2013) cert. denied Liberty 
Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 134 S.Ct. 683 (2013).  
108. I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a)(1); 4980H(c)(2)(A)(CCH 2016).  A full-time employee is defined as an 
employee who is employed an average of at least 30 hours per week. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A) (CCH 
2016).  Full-time equivalent employees are a combination of employees, none of whom are full-time 
employees, who are counted as full-time employees for purposes of determining whether an employer is 
an applicable large employer.  See Treas. Reg. § 54.49809H-1(a)(22) (2015).  The full time equivalency 
rules apply only for the purposes of determining whether an employer employs an average of 50 or 
more full time employees and not for the purpose of determining the penalty amount. I.R.C. § 
4980H(c)(2)(E)(CCH 2016).  Failure to offer such coverage results in the imposition of a penalty up to 
$ 2,000 per annum for each full time employee in excess of thirty if no coverage is provided and one 
employee qualifies for a premium tax credit or cost sharing subsidy.  I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a); 
4980H(c)(1)(CCH 2016).  The maximum annual penalty amount is $3,000 if unaffordable coverage is 
offered.  I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a)(1); 4980H(b)(1)(CCH 2016).  
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group health plan does not conform to the requirements of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.109  
The legislation, through the enactment of I.R.C. section 36B, provides 
tax credits to individuals and families whose income is below a certain 
threshold and who pay premiums for insurance through an Exchange 
established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.110  The credit is designed to subsidize health 
insurance coverage for taxpayers whose income does not exceed 400 
percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved.111 In general, 
the credit is the lesser of the premium cost or the excess of the premium 
cost of a baseline plan over a percentage, which increases as the taxpayer’s 
household income approaches 400 percent of the poverty line, of the 
taxpayer’s household income.112   
 
109. See I.R.C. §§ 4980D(a)–(b); 9815(CCH 2016).  The excise tax imposed by § 4980D 
predates the enactment of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  The excise tax is triggered by 
the failure of a plan to conform to the requirements of chapter 100 of the Internal Revenue Code.  I.R.C. 
§ 4980(a)(CCH 2016).  I.R.C. § 9815 was added to chapter 100 by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act to incorporate its changes into chapter 100. See Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, § 1563(f), 124 Stat. at 270 (as redesignated by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 
10107(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 911).  Plans cannot exclude coverage of preexisting conditions, must not, in 
general, impose lifetime or annual limits on the dollar amount of benefits, must offer coverage to 
dependent children under the age of twenty-six, and provide coverage of preventive services.  See 
generally Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 54.9815-2704T(2010) 54.9815-2711T(2010); 54.9815-2713T(2012); 
54.9815-2714T(2010).  The application of both section 4980H and the excise tax were at issue in the 
Court’s recent holding that closely-held corporations are protected by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768, 2777–78, 2780–81 
(2014). 
110. I.R.C. §§ 36B(a); 36B(c)(2)(A)(CCH 2016).  An individual who is covered under any 
eligible employer-sponsored plan or who is offered health insurance coverage through an eligible 
employer-sponsored plan under which the employee’s required contribution with respect to the plan 
does not exceed 9.5 percent of the applicable taxpayer’s income and which covers at least 60 percent of 
total benefit costs are not eligible for the credit.  I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(CCH 2016). A taxpayer also is 
ineligible for the credit is she is offered minimum essential coverage other than such coverage through 
the individual market. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)(CCH 2016). Advance payments of the credits may be 
made in the form of reductions to the monthly insurance premiums and such advance payments reduce 
the amount of the credit under § 36B. I.R.C. § 36B(f)(1)(CCH 2016).  In the event that advances exceed 
the credit amount to which the taxpayer is entitled the excess amount advanced increases the income tax 
owed by the taxpayer subject to certain limitations based on the level of the taxpayer’s household 
income.  I.R.C. § 36B(f)(2)(CCH 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-4 (2012).  
111. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(CCH 2016).  
112. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(B)–(C)(CCH 2016).  The applicable percentage varies from a minimum of 2 
percent to a maximum of 9.5 percent subject to adjustment to account for the possibility that health 
insurance costs increase faster than the rate of income growth. Additional adjustments are to be made 
beginning in 2019 if premium cost increases exceed the growth in the consumer price index and the 
subsidies exceed a certain level of gross domestic product.  See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(CCH 2016).  
Household income is the sum of the adjusted gross income, with certain modifications, of all 
individuals who were taken into account in determining the taxpayer’s family size and were required to 
file a tax return for the taxable year.  See I.R.C. § 36B(d)(2)(CCH 2016).  The federal poverty line is the 
most recently published poverty guideline as of the first day of the regular enrollment period for 
coverage through an Exchange for the calendar year. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(h)(2012).  
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The allowance of a tax credit can trigger the applicability of the 
individual mandate with respect to the individual entitled to the credit 
because the credit reduces such individual’s required contribution for 
purposes of determining whether insurance coverage is affordable by such 
individual and, therefore, mandated.113  In addition, the attainment of a 
credit or cost sharing reduction by one employee triggers the penalty 
imposed on employers by I.R.C. section 4980H.114  
On its face, I.R.C. section 36B limits eligibility for tax credits to 
taxpayers who are enrolled in State Exchanges.115  However, regulations 
were issued pursuant to which participants in the Federal Exchange would 
also qualify for the credit.116  Virginia did not establish an Exchange and its 
residents may purchase health insurance through HealthCare.gov, the 
Federal Exchange.  Several Virginia residents challenged the validity of the 
regulations that entitled qualified enrollees on Federal Exchanges to a tax 
credit because the availability of such credit rendered their insurance costs 
affordable under the statute thereby subjecting them to the individual 
mandate.117  The Fourth Circuit applied Chevron and unanimously affirmed 
the district court’s holding that the Treasury regulations were within the 
Treasury’s authority.118  The court held that the statutory language did not 
unambiguously reveal the intent of Congress with respect to the availability 
of tax credits for individuals enrolled on the Federal Exchange.119  The 
court then proceeded to Chevron step two.120  According to the court, the 
Treasury regulations were a permissible interpretation of the statute 
because the objectives of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
 
113. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii)(CCH 2016). 
114. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
116. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.36B-1(k)(2012)(defining Exchange by reference to 45 C.F.R. § 
155.20); 1.36B-2(a)(2012)(providing eligibility for credit by enrollment in an Exchange); 45 C.F.R. § 
155.20(2012)(stating that the term Exchange refers to State Exchanges, regional Exchanges, subsidiary 
Exchanges, and a Federally-facilitated Exchange)(emphasis added). 
117. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.  
118. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’g King v. Sebelius, 977 F.Supp. 2d 415 
(E.D. Va. 2014).  
119. Id. at 369.  The language of I.R.C. § 36B referred only to Exchanges established by a State, 
but the court refused to “‘confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.’”  Id. 
at 368 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007)). The 
court believed that § 1311, the provision authorizing State exchanges, § 1321, the provision authorizing 
the Federal Exchange, and a definitional provision of the Act could plausibly be read to treat the 
Federal Exchange as an Exchange established by a State.  Id. at 369.  The court also found that two 
other statutory provisions were irreconcilable with the appellants’ assertion that I.R.C. § 36B denies the 
availability of credits to taxpayers enrolled on the Federal Exchange.  See id. at 369–71.  Moreover, the 
court found little guidance in the legislative history of the statute.  Despite the fact that several floor 
statements by Senators indicated that all taxpayers would have access to the credits, such statements 
could have been made under the assumption that all states would establish Exchanges and that the 
denial of credits to taxpayers enrolled in the Federal Exchange would induce states to establish their 
own Exchanges.  Id. at 371–72. 
120.  Id. at 372. 
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are to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and 
to decrease the cost of health care.121  Therefore, the broad availability of 
tax credits to subsidize the cost of health insurance is congruent with the 
statute’s objectives.122  
A similar challenge to the Treasury regulations was brought before the 
D.C. Circuit by individual appellants who resided in states that did not 
establish Exchanges.123  In a 2-1 decision, the court reversed the district 
court’s judgment that upheld the validity of the regulations.124  Unlike the 
Fourth Circuit, the court found no need to proceed to Chevron step two 
because it believed that Congress did speak directly to the precise question 
at issue and that tax credits are available only for enrollees in State 
Exchanges as the statutory language of section 36B made clear.125  
The Court, in King v. Burwell, affirmed the judgment of the Fourth 
Circuit and held that enrollees on the Federal Exchange are entitled to tax 
credits.126  Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, briefly reviewed the 
economic underpinnings of the legislation, took notice of unsuccessful 
efforts by various states to expand individuals’ access to health insurance 
coverage, and contrasted those efforts with the efforts of states that 
achieved success in expanding health insurance coverage.127  
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Court did not believe that the Treasury 
regulations were entitled to Chevron deference.  According to the Court, 
the deference afforded administrative agencies in their interpretations of 
 
121. Id. at 373–74. 
122. Id. at 374–75. 
123. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’g Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F.Supp. 
3d 1 (D.D.C., 2014).  The decision of the court was vacated and a rehearing en banc was granted. 
Halbig v. Burwell, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (Sept. 4, 2014).  However, the case subsequently was 
held in abeyance pending the decision of the Supreme Court.  Halbig v. Burwell, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23434 (Nov. 12, 2014).   
124. See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d at 399.  
125. According to the court, the Federal Exchange is equivalent to State Exchanges in certain 
respects but it differs from State Exchanges in one crucial respect—it is not established by a State as 
required by the language of I.R.C. § 36B.  Id. at 400.  Section 1321 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, the provision that authorizes the Federal Exchange, omits any language that 
suggests that such Exchange should be treated as a State Exchange.  Id.  The court presumed that 
Congress’s use of dissimilar language in different parts of a statute was intentional, rejected the 
government’s contention that all Exchanges are, by definition, established by a State, and held that the 
absurdity doctrine did not apply.  Id. at 400–402.  Despite the fact that the court believed that the 
statutory language was unambiguous, it did proceed to examine the legislative history of the statute. In 
the court’s opinion, the legislative history failed to provide demonstrable evidence that Congress 
intended to provide tax credits to eligible enrollees on all Exchanges.  The court found the legislative 
history inconclusive in this respect and believed that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the 
limitation of credits to enrollees in State Exchanges was a means to incentivize states to establish their 
own Exchanges.  Id. at 408.  Moreover, it refused to countenance the absence of any suggestion in the 
legislative history that credits be so limited as evidence of an intent to the contrary because silence is 
not evidence that Congress meant something other than what it said. Id. at 408.  
126. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2496.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Id.   
127. Id. at 248–86.  
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statutory ambiguities under Chevron is premised on the notion that such 
ambiguities “constitute an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency 
to fill in the statutory gaps.”128  This implication may be unwarranted in 
“extraordinary cases” and, according to the Chief Justice Roberts, this was 
an extraordinary case.129 
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving 
billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price 
of health insurance for millions of people.  Whether those credits 
are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep 
“economic and political significance” that is central to this 
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to 
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. . . . It is 
especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this 
decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health 
insurance policy of this sort. . . .  This is not a case for the IRS.130  
Plain statutory language is enforceable according to its terms but whether 
such language is, in fact, plain “‘may only become evident when placed in 
context . . . and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme”’131  At this point, King v. Burwell degenerated into an exercise in 
statutory interpretation.  The majority, by my count, employed three canons 
of statutory construction: the words of a statute must be read in context and 
given their place in the overall statutory scheme; federal statutes cannot be 
interpreted to negate their own stated purposes; and fundamental details of 
a regulatory scheme are not altered in vague or ancillary provisions.132  The 
dissent employed its own canons to refute the majority’s conclusion: the 
plain and obvious meaning of a statute is preferable to other meanings; it is 
presumed that lawmakers use words in their natural and ordinary 
 
128. Id. at 2488 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 
(2000)). 
129. Id. at 2488–89 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159). 
130. Id. at 2489 (citations omitted).  
131. Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132–33).   
132. Id. at 2489, 2493, 2495.  The Court examined the definitional provisions of the statute and, 
similar to the Fourth Circuit, found that the most natural meaning of the definitional provisions would 
result in no qualified individuals for the Federal Exchange and that such Exchange would not be an 
Exchange at all—results clearly not contemplated by the statute.  Id. at 2490–91.  Moreover, unless the 
Federal Exchange is deemed established under the same statutory provision as State Exchanges, none of 
the statutory requirements are applicable to the Federal Exchange.  Id. at 2491.  In addition, the Court 
agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the information reporting requirements imposed on the Federal 
Exchange made little sense if tax credits were not available to enrollees in such Exchange.  Id. at 2491–
92.  Apparently, the importance of contextual analysis -the first canon noted—to Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kennedy varies from case to case. Ironically, in another case that involved the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, both the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy placed significant 
emphasis on the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” in reaching the conclusion that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act was applicable to closely-held corporations.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2768–70.   
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signification; lawmakers do not use terms that have no operation at all; and 
specific terms govern over general terms.133  
The enlistment of these tools by both the majority and the dissent was 
made for one purpose—to answer the question of whether Congress 
intended for tax credits to be available to enrollees on the Federal 
Exchange.134  The Court found it possible to interpret the language of 
I.R.C. section 36B either to limit tax credits to enrollees in State Exchanges 
or to permit enrollees on both State and the Federal Exchange to qualify for 
tax credits.135  The Court examined the broader structure of the legislation 
to clarify the ambiguity in favor of the government.136 
 The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, asserted that 
Congress could not have “come up with a clearer way to limit tax credits to 
State Exchanges than to use the words ‘established by the State.’”137  
Conceding that context always is a relevant consideration in statutory 
interpretation, Justice Scalia stated that context “is a tool for understanding 
the terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting them.”138  Moreover, the 
dissent disagreed that the statutory language evidenced the intent to treat 
 
133. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2497–2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
134. It has been suggested that this case also concerned two broader issues—the manner in which 
legislation is drafted and debated and the appropriateness of increasing the compliance burden on an 
already overburdened I.R.S.  See Armando Gomez, Why Should Tax Lawyers Care About King v. 
Burwell?, 2015 COLUM. J. TAX L.-TAX MATTERS 4, 5 (2015).  Whether or not the Court could have, or 
should have, considered those issues is beyond the scope of this work.  
135. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2491.  The Court noted that its preference for the avoidance of 
surplusage is not an absolute rule and rejected the notion that if Congress intended the tax credits to be 
available for qualified individuals enrolled on all Exchanges then the words “established by the State” 
would have been unnecessary.  Id. at 2492.  The legislation was poorly drafted due, in large part, to the 
political machinations that were employed in order to secure its passage.  Id.  Accordingly, the Court 
found that the phrase “an Exchange established by the State” to be ambiguous.  Id. 
136. According to the Court, a limitation of tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges would 
“likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress designed the Act to avoid.”  Id. at 2492–93. Such an 
interpretation would run counter to the canon that federal statutes cannot be interpreted to negate their 
own stated purpose.  Id. at 2493 (quoting N.Y. State Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 
419–20 (1973)).  The Court, rejecting the assertion that Congress believed that the limitation of tax 
credits to enrollees in State Exchanges would entice the states to establish Exchanges, believed that the 
establishment of a Federal Exchange evidenced that Congress contemplated state reluctance to 
cooperate and established the Federal Exchange as a fallback in the event of such state reluctance.  Id. 
at 2494.  Finally, the Court delved into the intricacies of § 36B and noted that the denial of tax credits, 
if such credits are to be denied, becomes evident only after delving into a “sub-sub-sub section” of the 
statute.  Id. at 2495.  Due to the fundamental importance of the tax credits to the overall statutory 
scheme, the Court believed that a congressional intent to deny such credits would have been made 
known in a prominent way and not buried in the interstices of the statute.  Id.   
137. Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
138. Id. Justice Scalia did not believe that the phrase “established by the State” was surplusage. 
Redundant language is commonly used by lawmakers but the majority violated a virtually absolute 
principle of statutory construction by rendering the phrase in question a nullity.  Id. at 2498.  Because 
this language was repeated seven times throughout the statute but not throughout the entire statute, 
common sense dictates that the use of a phrase in some cases and another phrase in other cases indicates 
that the two phrases have contrasting meanings.  Id. at 2498–99. 
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the Federal and State Exchanges as equivalent and that the majority’s 
interpretation rendered various statutory provisions nonsensical.139  Justice 
Scalia was unmoved by the majority’s reliance on the legislation’s design 
and purpose. The notion that the health insurance market would be 
destabilized by the lack of tax subsidies to enrollees in the Federal 
Exchange, if true, is not proof that the statute does not mean what it says 
but is just a flaw in the law.140  Justice Scalia accused the majority of 
ignoring other competing purposes.  The legislation evidences the 
congressional desire for state participation in the establishment and 
management of Exchanges and a holding contrary to the majority’s would 
encourage states to establish their own Exchanges thereby achieving the 
market reforms desired with active state participation.141  
 
1. Analysis and Critique   
 
The Court came to the conclusion that Congress intended to make tax 
credits available to enrollees in the Federal Exchange.  At that point, there 
is no ambiguity, Chevron step one is failed, and that should have been the 
end of the inquiry.  In Chevron, the Court noted that ". . . [i]f this choice 
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were 
committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it 
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the 
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."142  The 
Court failed to explain how an accommodation that Congress would not 
have sanctioned could ever be a “reasonable accommodation of conflicting 
policies that were committed to the agency’s care.”  
Jonathan Adler and Michael Cannon, the authors who gave 
prominence to the issue in King v. Burwell, stated the following:  
 
139. Several provisions of the legislation mandated state officials to undertake certain tasks 
related to the administration of Exchanges.  The dissent questioned how a state official possibly could 
undertake those tasks for an Exchange that is operated by the federal government.  Id. at 2499.  Even if 
it were true that Congress intended to equate the two types of Exchanges in general, for the specific 
purpose of the tax credits the two types of Exchanges are not equivalent.  Id. at 2500.  The dissent found 
nothing unusual in the fact that the limitation of tax credits to enrollees in State Exchanges is found in a 
formula, rather than a definitional, provision.  Such drafting is common in the I.R.C. Id. at 2501–02 
(providing several examples of such drafting).  
140. Id. at 2503.  Moreover, this flaw existed, without dispute, in the long-term care insurance 
program established by the legislation and in the general insurance market in the Federal Territories.  
Id.  Whether or not the statute was the result of Congress’s lack of due care and deliberation was of no 
moment to the dissent. It is not the role of the Court to amend a law that says what Congress did not 
intend to say or “to make everything come out right when Congress does not do its job properly.”  Id. at 
2506. 
141. Id. at 2504.  
142. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United States v. 
Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 382–83 (1961)). 
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Suppose, however, the IRS was able to convince a reviewing 
court that the PPACA is ambiguous on whether it limits tax 
credits to state-based Exchanges. The IRS would also need to 
demonstrate that this ambiguity was evidence of an implicit 
delegation of authority to interpret the statute in a way that would 
authorize the creation of new tax credits, new entitlement 
spending, and new taxes on employers and individuals beyond the 
purview of the traditional legislative appropriations process. This 
is not the sort of authority one should lightly presume Congress 
delegated to an agency. To paraphrase the Supreme Court, 
Congress does not hide such “elephants in mouseholes.”143 
If Congress does not hide “elephants in mouseholes” then there should be 
no ambiguity that would justify Treasury’s action. Again, either the issue 
was committed to the agency’s care or it was not.  Clarity of statutory 
language is, of course, the best evidence of whether or not a statute 
evidences a congressional intent with respect to the issue in question.  If 
I.R.C. section 36B stated that tax credits are available to eligible 
individuals enrolled on “any Exchange,” or, alternatively, “an Exchange 
established by a State (but not the Federal government or any 
instrumentality therefor)” then the intent of Congress would have been 
manifested clearly.  Unfortunately, Congress often does not manifest its 
intent in so obvious a manner.  Chief Justice Roberts stated that the 
meaning of the term “established by the State” was ambiguous but then 
proceeded to explain why Congress intended for such term to encompass 
the Federal Exchange.144  Ambiguity of language should not be confused 
with ambiguity of intent. Congressional intent can be gleaned from 
extraneous sources as the Court did in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., a case in which it exhaustively examined other 
congressional actions to determine that Congress did not intend to provide 
the FDA with regulatory authority over tobacco.145  
The importance of the issue, whether to an overall regulatory scheme, 
to the economy, or to some other matter of import may be—and perhaps 
should be—a factor in the courts’ inquiry with respect to congressional 
intent but it should not be treated as conclusive evidence of Congress’s 
intent.  Common sense dictates that the more central that the resolution of a 
seeming ambiguity is to a regulatory scheme the more likely it is that the 
legislature intended a particular result.  However, Congress may have given 
no thought at all to the matter for one of two reasons.  First, the matter may 
implicate the application of a statutory requirement to one of many possible 
 
143. Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS 
Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 180 (2013) (quoting Whitman 
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
144. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
145. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 592 U.S. at 133–56. 
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fact patterns potentially covered by the rule and Congress intended an 
agency to deal with such specifics.  It is precisely these situations that 
justify Chevron deference because the regulatory agencies have the policy 
and technical expertise to deal with such situations and the flexibility to 
alter their positions as circumstances warrant.  
Second, Congress may not have contemplated the issue at all and the 
issue’s importance casts doubt on Congress’s intent to delegate its 
resolution to an agency.  Such a situation may arise, for example, as a result 
of technological, legal, or social developments not contemplated by 
Congress at the time the legislation was enacted. In such circumstances, the 
courts should invalidate the regulations in question and leave the matter for 
Congress to resolve.  Neither FDA v. Brown & Williamson nor King v. 
Burwell presented a case in which Congress gave no thought to a matter of 
extraordinary importance.  In both cases, the Court was able to glean 
Congress’s intent with the respect to the issue presented.  Both cases 
were—in reality—decided at Chevron step one.  
Whether an issue’s importance negates congressional delegation is 
itself a difficult issue.146  King v. Burwell would appear to be an easy case 
in this respect because qualification for tax credits is critical to the 
operation of the health care reforms advanced by the statute and presented 
an issue that was contemplated by Congress.  Yet, the Court and the Fourth 
Circuit court came to opposite conclusions about whether Congress 
implicitly delegated authority to the I.R.S.147  Less than a decade ago, the 
Sixth and Second Circuits upheld the so-called “check-the box” regulations 
that were issued ten years previously.148  These regulations dealt with the 
classification of an entity for tax purposes.149  For decades, the 
 
146. Assume that the phrase “established by the State but not by the federal government or any 
instrumentality thereof)” replaced the language presently found in I.R.C. § 36B and that neither the 
statute nor its legislative history made mention of the possibility that states and the federal government 
could partner to operate an Exchange.  Assume further that the Treasury Department issued regulations 
that defined an Exchange “established by the State (but not by the federal government or any 
instrumentality thereof)” to include Exchanges that were operated by states in partnership with the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  This regulation would satisfy both the policy goal of 
insurance affordability and the policy goal of state participation.  If Congress contemplated that states 
would either form an Exchange or would not participate at all then the possibility of a federal-state 
partnership in operating an Exchange would not have occurred to Congress at the time the legislation 
was deliberated and enacted.  However, if a great number of states chose to partner with the Department 
of Health and Human Services then the importance of this issue to the overall statutory scheme would 
be significant.  It is unclear how a court would determine whether this issue is of such import to negate 
the implication that Congress intended the Treasury Department to deal with it. 
147. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d at 373.  The Court had indicated, in Smiley v. Citibank, 517 
U.S. 735 (1996), that conflicting interpretations of a statute by courts—in this case, the Supreme Courts 
of New Jersey and California—provides strong evidence of statutory ambiguity.  Intuitively, the same 
inference should be drawn by conflicting interpretations of a statute by the Circuit Courts.  
148. See Littriello v. United States, 448 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1186 
(2008); McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007).  
149. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, et. seq. (1996). 
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classification of an entity as a corporation or a partnership for tax purposes 
was determined by the examination of certain attributes of the entity in 
question.150  The emergence of limited liability companies (LLCs ) during 
the 1990s magnified the importance of entity classification because the 
LLC form provided taxpayers with an extremely flexible non-corporate 
vehicle with which to limit the personal liability exposure of the entity’s 
owners.  The Treasury regulations completely discarded the previous entity 
classification rules and adopted a system whereby noncorporate entities 
elect whether they would be taxed as corporations or partnerships.151  
Both the Sixth and Second Circuits upheld the regulations under 
Chevron.152  The classification of an entity has enormous tax consequences.  
The regulations certainly simplified tax administration and reduced the risk 
of tax litigation. Perhaps the emergence of LLCs warranted such 
simplification.  Equally plausible, however, is that the Treasury regulations 
would spell the virtual death knell of the corporate form for non-publicly 
traded entities.153  Neither circuit court considered the possibility that 
Congress would not have a delegated such a critical matter to the Treasury.   
King v. Burwell could undermine the equipoise that Mayo provided 
between the I.R.S. and other federal agencies.154  According to the Court, it 
was unlikely that Congress delegated the authority to establish a 
qualification for tax subsidies, a matter central to the operation of Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, to the I.R.S.155   Chief Justice Roberts 
stated that the delegation of such a matter to the I.R.S. was even more 
unlikely given its lack of expertise in health care policy.156  Because agency 
expertise is one factor that supports Chevron deference, this statement 
should trouble the Treasury.157  Tax legislation often serves policy goals 
unrelated to revenue collection. Federal housing, education, health care, 
and retirement security policy goals are aided, in part, through the tax 
 
150. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, et. seq. (1960); Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 
344 (1935); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). 
151. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a)-(b)(2006).  Non-corporate entities owned by one person 
elect to be taxed as corporations or to be disregarded.  Entities incorporated under a federal or state 
statute, insurance companies and banks, entities wholly owned by a State or political subdivision 
thereof or a foreign government, and certain foreign entities are treated as corporations.  See Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.7701-2(b)(2012). 
152. Littriello v. United States, 448 F.3d at 378; McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d at 
105.  I offer no opinion on whether Chevron was applied properly in these cases. 
153. Publicly traded entities, except for entities who generate at least 90 percent of their gross 
income from certain passive sources, are treated as corporations regardless of the entities’ legal form.  
See generally I.R.C. § 7704(CCH 2016).  
154. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.  
156. Id.  
157. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
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system.158  Will I.R.S. lack of expertise in these areas somehow subject its 
regulations to greater scrutiny?  At a minimum, such a statement provides 
fodder for taxpayers to challenge Treasury regulations.  
 
B.The State Farm Doctrine 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act permits a court to invalidate 
agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.159 One year before Chevron the 
Court decided the seminal case concerning the Act’s arbitrary and 
capricious standard, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the 
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.160  The 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, enacted to reduce 
automobile accidents and the deaths and injuries that ensued from such 
accidents, directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue practical and 
objective motor vehicle safety standards.161  The statute also directed the 
Secretary to consider all relevant safety data and the reasonableness and 
practicality of proposed safety standards and whether such standards will 
contribute to carrying out the purpose of the statute.162  Between 1967 and 
1978 the Department of Transportation issued several standards, at first 
simply requiring automobile manufacturers to install seatbelts and later 
requiring full passive front seat occupant restraint systems—automatic 
seatbelts or airbags—in model year 1984 vehicles.163  In 1981, the 
 
158. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25A (providing a credit for certain educational expenses); 36 (providing a 
credit for first time homebuyers); 105 (providing an exclusion for employer provided medical 
insurance); 213 (providing a deduction for medical and dental expenses); 401–09 (providing tax 
deferred retirement vehicles)(CCH 2016).  
159. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2016).  Courts may also set aside agency action that are contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right; taken without observance of required procedure; decisions in 
certain hearings that are unsupported by substantial evidence; or unwarranted by the facts to the extent 
that the facts are subject to a trial de novo.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B)-(F)(2016).  Unless a statute 
provides otherwise only final agency actions are reviewable by a court. See 5 U.S.C. § 704(2016).  In 
general, a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review.  5 U.S.C. § 
702(2016).  However, agency actions are not subject to judicial review if a statute precludes such 
review or the action is committed to agency discretion by law.  5 U.S.C. §§ 701(1)-(2)(2016).  See 
supra note 52 for a discussion of actions committed to agency discretion and the non-delegation 
doctrine. 
160. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
161. Id. at 33. 
162. Id. at 33–34. 
163. Id. at 34–37.  Originally, passive restraints were required in all vehicles manufactured after 
August 15, 1975. In the two years preceding the effective date of the passive restraint requirement 
vehicles could be manufactured with passive restraint or shoulder belts coupled with an ignition lock.  
The shoulder belt/ignition lock option was selected by most manufacturers but the unpopularity of this 
feature led Congress to amend the statute in 1974 to foreclose this option.  The effective date was later 
postponed for approximately one year and then suspended pending the outcome of a demonstration 
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Department ordered a one year delay in the new standard and later 
proposed a rescission of the standard. Ultimately, the Department rescinded 
the standard.164  
The Department of Transportation asserted that it no longer found that 
passive restraints would yield significant safety benefits.  The agency 
assumed that airbags would be installed in sixty percent of new cars and 
that the remaining forty percent would comply with the standard through 
the installation of automatic seat belts.165  Instead, the vehicle manufactures 
planned to meet the standard through the installation of automatic seat belts 
in approximately ninety-nine percent of new cars.166  Most automatic seat 
belts could be disengaged with relative ease.  As a result, the agency 
believed that the costs to comply with the standard would be unreasonable 
in light of the minimal safety benefits to be derived from its imposition.167  
In addition, the agency believed that the imposition of an expensive, yet 
ineffective, standard would negatively affect public attitudes toward 
vehicle safety thereby hindering future agency safety initiatives.168  
State Farm and an automobile insurance trade group challenged the 
rescission of the standard and the D.C. Circuit held that the agency’s 
rescission of the safety standard was not supported by clear and convincing 
reasons because there was insufficient evidence to support the agency’s 
conclusion regarding seat belt use and because the agency failed to give 
due consideration to either a requirement to install non-detachable seat 
belts or a requirement to install airbags.169  The Court agreed with the D.C. 
Circuit that rescission of a regulation is reviewable under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard but it held so in more sweeping terms.  According to 
the Court, “the revocation of an extant regulations is substantially different 
than a failure to act” and such a change in course obligates an agency “to 
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be 
 
project.  Finally, a new Secretary of Transportation had the Department of Transportation issue the new 
standard in 1978.  The standard was to be phased in first with large cars in model year 1982 and then to 
all cars by model year 1984.  Id. at 37. 
164. Id. at 38. 
165. Id.  
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 39. 
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 39–40.  The court held that the rescission was reviewable under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard and that such rescission was not analogous to a failure to issue regulations.  The 
Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a court to compel agency action that has unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(2016).  However, the courts are much more reluctant to 
compel agency action than they are to invalidate actions once such actions are taken.  In general, courts 
will compel action only if they find that the agency has a clear, nondiscretionary duty to act.  Moreover, 
many forms of agency inaction are considered committed to agency discretion by law or are not deemed 
final agency action, and therefore, unreviewable. Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial 
Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 465–66 (2008). 
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required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”170  The Court, 
however, disagreed with the lower court that this particular rescission was 
subject to a heightened standard of review due to congressional action.  The 
standard of review, in this case the arbitrary and capricious standard, is 
neither enlarged nor diminished by subsequent congressional action.171  
The Court noted that the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow 
and does not invite a court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.172  However, an agency must articulate a satisfactory explanation 
for its action and there must be a rational connection between the facts 
found and the agency’s action.173  According to the Court, an agency rule is 
arbitrary and capricious if the agency: 1) relied on factors that Congress did 
not intend it to consider; 2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect 
of the issue in question; 3) offered an explanation that is counterfactual; or 
4) offered an explanation that is so implausible that it belies a difference of 
opinion or agency expertise.174  An agency’s reasoning may be discerned 
by a court if its reasoning is opaque.175  However, the Court, citing SEC v. 
Chenery Corp, stated that the judiciary cannot make up for agency 
deficiencies nor provide a reasoned basis for an agency’s action that has 
not been advanced by the agency itself.176  
The Court held that the rescission of the passive restraint requirement 
was arbitrary and capricious.  With respect to air bags, the Court held that 
the Department of Transportation’s belief that detachable seat belts would 
prove ineffective, even if proven true, in no way provides a rational basis 
for rescinding the airbag requirement.177  The Court found that the 
Department of Transportation gave no consideration to amending the 
standard to mandate airbags in light of its position that detachable seat belts 
are not effective.178  The agency’s assertions that airbags create difficulties 
in the production of small cars and that public reaction to mandatory 
airbags would be negative were, according to the Court, post hoc 
rationalizations.179  Chenery mandates that agency action, if it is to be 
sustained, be based on the reasons articulated by the agency when it took 
action.180    
 
170. Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 41–42. 
171. Id. at 44–45. 
172. Id. at 43. 
173. Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inv. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).  
177. Id. at 48–49. 
178. Id. at 50.  
179. Id.  
180. Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inv. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 168; SEC v. Chenery 
Corp.  332 U.S. at 196; Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981)).  
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With respect to automatic seatbelts, the Court held that the agency 
failed to consider evidence regarding the effect that detachable seat belts 
would have on vehicle safety.  The Court acknowledged that agencies often 
operate in the face of uncertainty, that no evidence in direct support of a 
conclusion may be available, and that policy conclusions may be the result 
of judgments drawn from facts and probabilities.181  However, an agency 
must do more than merely recite “substantial uncertainty” as its rationale 
for an action.182  Instead, it must rationally connect the facts found with the 
choice made and justify why it is rescinding a rule before searching for 
further evidence.183  The Court found the Department of Transportation’s 
reliance on test data and manual seat belt usage data to be inadequate and, 
in certain respects, misplaced.184  The Court also held that the agency did 
not adequately consider a “continuous passive” seat belt option as a 
solution to the problems posed by automatic seat belts.185  
 
1. Is State Farm Distinct from Chevron?  
 
In many respects, State Farm’s “hard look” review of agency action is 
difficult to extricate from the Chevron two step test.  If an agency came to 
an action based on factors that Congress did not intend the agency to 
consider then such action apparently would fail Chevron step one because 
Congress left no ambiguity for the agency to act upon—at least with 
respect to the factors that Congress prohibited.  In most cases, the 
application of State Farm and Chevron step two will lead to similar 
conclusions.  For example, if agency justification for an action is 
counterfactual or implausible then that action is unlikely to pass muster 
under Chevron step two.  Likewise, if the agency entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the issue in question then whatever action was taken 
by the agency is unlikely to satisfy Chevron step two.  The American Bar 
Association and several scholars have argued that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard should be incorporated into Chevron step two because 
both tests involve similar inquiries and that the discernment of a conceptual 
distinction between the two standards is difficult.186  I agree that Chevron 
and State Farm may be inextricable when Chevron step two is failed.  I am 
not convinced, however, that the failure to meet the State Farm standard is 
a sufficient condition for the failure of Chevron step two. 
It is possible to discern a distinction between State Farm and Chevron.  
The latter inquires whether an agency has reasonably interpreted the law 
 
181. Id. at 51–52. 
182. Id. at 52. 
183. Id.  
184. Id. at 52–54. 
185. Id. at 55. 
186. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 162 –63 (2010).  
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while the former inquires whether the agency has articulated a reasonable 
factual and/or policy basis for its actions.  The law versus facts distinction 
between the two tests implies, somewhat counterintuitively, that the courts 
are more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of law than to an 
agency’s factual and policy conclusions.  This point was made by Justice 
Breyer.187  In many, if not most, cases, both State Farm and Chevron will 
yield the same result. However, the tests are not identical.  While Chevron 
rests on notions of agency expertise and congressional intent, State Farm 
has other justifications, including the imposition of discipline on agency 
decisions, the legitimization of agency action, and enablement of judicial 
review.188  State Farm more appropriately should be seen as an additional 
hurdle for agencies to jump after they have cleared Chevron step two.  
Assuming that the requisite statutory gap exists Chevron step two 
prohibits agency actions that are either arbitrary and capricious in 
substance or contrary to the statute.189  As discussed earlier, if Chevron step 
one does not yield a mandatory result then Chevron step two permits any 
number of alternatives so long as those alternatives are reasonable.  State 
Farm inquires why the agency chose a particular alternative among the 
possible permissible alternatives and examines if the reasons articulated by 
the agency make sense in light of the factual record and congressional 
policy preferences.  It is conceivable that an agency choose a course of 
action that, in substance, does no violence to the statute yet is not 
adequately justified by the agency.  
In fact, State Farm itself and Mayo provide examples of this 
possibility.  In State Farm, the statute in question provided the Department 
of Transportation with significant latitude to take action to improve motor 
vehicle safety.190  Had the Department of Transportation issued a rule that 
mandated only passive seat belts, only air bags, seat belts for certain cars 
and air bags for others, or manual seat belts with an interlock or buzzer 
feature, I imagine that Chevron step two would have sanctioned each of 
these alternatives.  Each of these alternatives appears to be reasonable 
under the statutory mandate.  At this point, State Farm requires the agency 
to articulate the facts to support the choice it made.  In Mayo, Treasury 
regulations required that medical residents be subject to payroll taxes.191  
The Court found that the I.R.C. did not address the issue of student-workers 
 
187. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 761, 765 (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363, 394 (1986)). 
188. See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, 
and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1820–23 (2012). 
189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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thereby Chevron step one was met.192  The regulations in question 
addressed the status of such individuals on the basis of hours worked as 
opposed to the primary purpose of the work.193  Determining full-time 
employment status on the basis of hours worked is neither arbitrary or 
capricious in substance nor contrary to the statute.  The Treasury 
articulated satisfactory reasons for its choice of hours worked as the critical 
variable in determining full-time employment status.194  Had the Treasury 
failed to provide reasons for its choice the regulations in question would 
have been invalidated under State Farm but not under Chevron.  
Chevron step two is, or should be, applied in the abstract. Does the 
statute permit this action? If the answer to this question is no then State 
Farm is inapplicable.  If the answer to this question is yes, then State Farm 
takes a hard look at the reasons behind the action.  The fact that the failure 
of Chevron step two inevitably will result in the failure of the State Farm 
test does not mean that the opposite is true. Chevron step two may be met 
yet State Farm may be violated.  
For a tax attorney, State Farm meant insurance and not part of her 
administrative law tool kit.  Unlike Chevron, National Muffler, Skidmore, 
and, more recently, Mayo the State Farm case garnered little attention from 
the tax bar.  The Supreme Court has never examined tax regulations under 
the State Farm standard.195  Recently, State Farm has surfaced in two tax 
cases.  In one case, the court applied both Chevron and State Farm to 
invalidate a Treasury regulation.  In the other, a case with significant 
financial ramifications for multinational enterprises, the court invalidated a 
Treasury regulation under State Farm. 
 
2. State Farm and Tax Regulations  
 
a. Dominion Resources 
 
I.R.C. section 263A, the uniform capitalization rules, sets forth rules 
for the capitalization of costs attributable to real or personal property 
produced by a taxpayer and to real or personal property acquired by a 
taxpayer for resale.196  Under the statute, both direct and indirect costs are 
 
192. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 52–53. 
193. See id. at 50. 
194. The Treasury justified its actions on the basis of administrative efficiency and the policy 
underlying the Social Security Act.  See id. at 59–60. 
195. Two scholars recently examined all Supreme Court decisions between 1983 and 2014 that 
involved an arbitrary and capricious holding.  Their compilation included one tax case, Mayo.  See 
Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1407–12 (2016).  
However, the Court did not review the Treasury regulation at issue in that case under State Farm.  See 
supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
196. I.R.C. § 263A(a)–(b)(CCH 2016). 
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subject to capitalization.197  Interest costs incurred during the production 
period and allocable to real property and certain personal property with a 
long useful life are subject to capitalization.198  In determining the amount 
of interest expense required to be capitalized interest on any debt that is 
directly attributable to production expenditures with respect to a property 
are assigned to that property.199  In addition, interest on any other debt is 
assigned to property under production to the extent that such debt could 
have been reduced if the production expenditures had not been incurred.200  
Thus, interest expense directly incurred by reason of production is 
capitalizable, such as interest on a construction loan.  Moreover, if 
production is financed by equity, internal cash flow, asset sales, or some 
other non-debt source of funds, then interest expense on any debt is 
capitalizable under the theory—or fiction—that, but the production 
expenditures, debt unrelated to production could have been paid down.    
The Treasury issued regulations that defined production expenditures, 
in the case of the purchase of property for further production, to include not 
only the costs of acquisition of the property and the improvements thereto 
but also the adjusted basis of other property that is temporarily idled by the 
production.201  This has the effect of adding to the total production 
expenditures and thereby increasing the amount of interest that must be 
capitalized.  In Dominion Resources v. United States, the validity of the 
regulation was challenged and the Court of Federal Claims applied 
Chevron and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment.202  
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims 
and held that the regulation in question failed both Chevron step two and 
the State Farm test.203   
The court concurred with the lower court that the statute’s definition 
of production expenditures was opaque, circular, and did not speak directly 
to the issue at hand.204  Accordingly, Chevron step one was satisfied.205  
The court, however, did not believe that the inclusion of the basis of idled 
property in the production costs for which interest must be capitalized was 
 
197. I.R.C. § 263A(a)(2)(CCH 2016). 
198. I.R.C. §§ 263A(f)(1); 263A(f)(4)(A)(CCH 2016).  The interest capitalization rules also apply 
to property whose estimated production period exceeds two years or whose estimated production period 
exceeds one year and whose cost exceeds $1,000,000.  I.R.C. § 263A(f)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii)(CCH 2016). 
199. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(1)(CCH 2016). 
200. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(2)(CCH 2016). 
201. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B)(1994).  
202. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011), rev’d, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012).  The court upheld the regulation despite its finding of several internal inconsistencies within 
the regulations and its belief that the regulation’s interpretation of the statute stretched the bounds of 
reasonableness.  See id. at 257.  
203. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 97 Fed. 
Cl. 239 (2011).  
204. Dominion Res., 681 F.3d at 1317 
205. Id.  
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a reasonable interpretation of the statute.  The court examined the statute’s 
language and its legislative history and concluded, for three reasons, that 
the rule did not implement the avoided cost principal in a sensible 
manner.206  
First, the court noted that the premise of the avoided cost rule is that 
debt could have been reduced had production expenditures not been 
incurred.  However, no such reduction in debt could have occurred with 
respect to the basis of an existing, yet idled facility.207  The cost of the idled 
property cannot be an avoided cost because such cost had already been 
incurred prior to production.208  The Treasury’s position makes sense only 
if one assumes that the idled facility could have been sold and the sale 
proceeds used to pay down debt.  This assumption belies reality because 
such a sale obviates the very reason for any improvement to the property.209  
Second, the court proceeded to parse the statutory language and held 
that the plain meaning of production expenditures is an amount actually 
expended or spent.210  Moreover, the statute determined the amount of 
interest to be capitalized based on the amount of debt that could have been 
reduced had no production expenditures been incurred.  The basis of 
existing property is not an amount that is incurred by a taxpayer.211  
Finally, the court concluded that the Treasury regulation could lead to 
absurd results.  The adjusted basis of idled property bears little relation to 
the cost of improvements.  Consequently, the same improvement could 
result in significantly different amounts of interest capitalized.212  
Dominion’s two improvements were comparable in cost yet the regulations 
required vastly different amounts of interest to be capitalized solely 
because the adjusted basis of the two idled properties that were improved 
differed by over $100 million.213  
The court further held that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious 
under State Farm because the Treasury offered no rationale when it issued 
the notice that provided guidance on the forthcoming regulation or when it 
issued the regulation in either proposed or final form.214  The court believed 
that Court of Federal Claims erroneously concluded that the Treasury’s 
reasoning was murky yet discernable.215  Moreover, the fact that the 
Treasury announced its position in advance is not sufficient to satisfy its 
 
206. Id. at 1318. 
207. Id.  
208. Id.  
209. Id. at 1318–19. 
210. Id. at 1318. 
211. Id. 
212. Id.  
213. Id.  
214. Id. at 1319. 
215. Id. 
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obligation under State Farm.216  State Farm is rarely applied in tax cases 
and Dominion Resources was the first appellate decision that invoked it to 
invalidate tax regulations.217 
 
1. Analysis and Critique 
 
The Federal Circuit’s application of Chevron and State Farm is 
somewhat puzzling. The court held that Chevron step one was met.  
However, one its reasons for rejecting the regulation under Chevron step 
two was the court’s belief that the statutory language plainly did not 
contemplate the Treasury’s interpretation.218  If so, then I fail to see how 
Chevron step one was met.  If the meaning of the terms “expended,” 
“spent,” and “incurred” are plain then the statute does speak to the precise 
issue at hand.  Moreover, having held that the regulations failed Chevron 
step two, there was no need for the court to delve into State Farm.  Based 
on the court’s Chevron analysis any Treasury explanation for its position 
would have been irrelevant.  
Judge Clevenger’s concurrence, in my opinion, nicely draws a 
distinction between Chevron step two and State Farm.  He agreed that the 
Treasury proffered no reasonable explanation for its interpretation of the 
avoided cost rule and, therefore, the regulation should be invalidated under 
State Farm.219  However, he did not believe that the regulation should have 
been invalidated under Chevron step two.220  Noting that the avoided cost 
rule is a fiction, the judge articulated several reasons why the Treasury’s 
position merited serious consideration.221  For example, the idling of a 
facility does result in the incurrence of costs—lost revenue, for example.222  
Moreover, the regulation minimizes the opportunity for tax evasion.  The 
basis of purchased property that has never been placed in service and 
improved is subject to interest capitalization.  The regulation at issue 
prevents a taxpayer from temporarily placing such a property in service to 
avoid interest capitalization.223  
 
216. Id. 
217. In Manella v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011), the court upheld the validity of a 
Treasury regulation under Chevron.  The dissent quoted from State Farm but the quote was used to 
support the argument that Chenery precluded the court from considering the Treasury’s assertions in 
this case. See id. at 127 (Ambro, J. dissenting). See supra notes 176, 180 for a discussion of Chenery. 
State Farm surfaced in a number of Tax Court cases over twenty years ago. See Patrick J. Smith, 
Manella, State Farm, and the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard, 131 No. 4, TAX NOTES 387, 393 n.44 
(2011). 
218. See supra note 210-11 and accompanying text. 
219. Dominion Res., 681 F.3d at 1320 (Clevenger, J. concurring). 
220. Id. at 1321. 
221. Id.  
222. Id. at 1321–22. 
223. Id. at 1322. 
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Judge Clevenger correctly noted that the majority’s application of 
Chevron “creates a binding rule (at least in this circuit) that the government 
can never re-promulgate its associated-property rule for property 
temporarily withdrawn from service, no matter how well-formed its 
reasoning.”224  Therein lies the distinction between Chevron and State 
Farm. If a regulation fails Chevron step two then State Farm is not relevant 
anymore because no explanation can turn an unreasonable position into a 
reasonable one.  As previously discussed, Chevron step two should permit 
any agency interpretation of a statute that is reasonable in the abstract.225  
At that point, the agency must articulate its reasons for why its particular 
interpretation was advanced. 
Admittedly, in circumstances that do not involve statutory 
interpretation the determination of whether an agency action is permissible 
in the abstract cannot be ascertained without examining the factual basis for 
the action.226  In such circumstances, Chevron and State Farm are joined 
quite firmly.227  In a deportation case, Justice Kagan conceded that the 
Court would have reached the same conclusion whether it reviewed a 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ action under Chevron step two or State 
Farm. She also stated “. . . that the more apt analytic framework in this case 
is standard ‘arbitrary [or] capricious’ review under the APA. The BIA’s 
comparable-grounds policy . . . is not an interpretation of any statutory 
language . . . .”228  However, a statutory interpretation that requires no 
empirical data for support, as was the case in Mayo, or a statutory 
interpretation for which no reasoned explanation is articulated, as was the 
case in State Farm and, according to Judge Clevenger, in Dominion 




224. Id. at 1322–23. See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial 
Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (discussing the circumstances in which a 
court will or will not remand a matter to an agency for further consideration); See also Allied-Signal, 
Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F. 2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that in certain 
circumstances, remand without vacatur is appropriate).  
225. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text. 
226. For example, assume that a statute requires that compensation must be reasonable to be 
deductible and that reasonableness is to be determined based on compensation paid for comparable 
work in comparable circumstances.  If the Treasury issued a regulation that determined reasonableness 
based on some metric such as profit, revenue, or some other such variable then whether this regulation 
is a permissible interpretation of the statute depends on whether the factual data supports that such a 
rule approximates comparable pay standards.  If not, it is not a permissible interpretation but this cannot 
be determined until a hard look review of the Treasury’s reasoning takes place. 
227. See e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 484 n.7 (2011) (stating that the application of 
Chevron step two to a deportation action would have yielded the same result as the Court’s application 
of State Farm when the agency’s discretion was not exercised in a reasonable manner).  
228. Id.  
229. See supra notes 177-85, 219 and accompanying text. 
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a. Altera 
 
The taxation of U.S. based multinational entities has garnered 
significant attention in recent years. Depending on one’s point of view, 
U.S. corporations are improperly shifting taxable income to foreign 
subsidiaries domiciled in low or no tax jurisdictions or are understandably 
doing their best to avoid the taxation of world-wide income at draconian 
tax rates.230 Although recent attention has been focused on the creative tax 
planning techniques of Apple, Google, and other prominent companies or 
on corporate acquisitions which result in a foreign situs for the parent 
company—so-called inversion—the prevention of improper income 
shifting by U.S. corporations has been a long-standing tax policy.231  In 
general, transactions between related entities are respected provided their 
terms are at arm’s length. 
I.R.C. section 482 seeks to determine the “true taxable income” of a 
controlled taxpayer by putting such taxpayer in “tax parity with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer.”232  This provision grants the I.R.S. broad authority 
to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, and 
allowances among controlled taxpayers as is necessary in order to prevent 
tax evasion or to clearly reflect the income of such entities.233  Treasury 
regulations implement this statutory mandate by means of the “arm’s 
length” standard, under which the result of a transaction among controlled 
taxpayers is compared to the result that would have arisen had the same 
transaction occurred among uncontrolled taxpayers.234  The regulations are 
lengthy and complex and deal with various transactions among controlled 
taxpayers, including the transfer of property, loans, and leases of 
property.235 
 
230. See e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Brian X. Chen, Apple Hits Tax Tension Head-On: 
Testimony by Cook Eases the Concerns of Some Senators, N.Y. TIMES May 22, 2013, at B1.  See also 
Chris William Sanchirico, As American As Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality, 68 
TAX L. REV. 207 (2015). 
231. See Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, Inquiry Into Tech Giants' Tax Strategies Nears 
End, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 4, 2013, at B1; Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps 
Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 29, 2012, at A1.   
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1)(2015); Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 400 (1972).  A 
controlled taxpayer is a taxpayer directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the same interests. A 
controlled taxpayer also includes a taxpayer that owns or controls other taxpayers.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(i)(5)(2015).  For this purpose, control is broadly defined.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–1(i)(4)(2015).   
233. I.R.C. § 482 (2016). 
234. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1)(2012). 
235. Various methodologies are employed under the regulations for determining the arm’s-length 
standard in a transaction involving the transfer of tangible property, including the comparable 
uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, the cost plus method, the comparable profits 
method, and the profits split method.  See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a)(1995).  The 
methodologies employed for determining the arm’s-length standard with respect to transactions 
involving the transfer of intangible property are the comparable uncontrolled transaction method, the 
comparable profits method, and the profits split method.  The regulations also allow for unspecified 
1 - MELONE MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2017  11:08 AM 
194 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:2 
In the case of a transfer or license of intangible property the statute 
requires that the income with respect to such transfer or license be 
commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.236  The 
commensurate with income standard for transfers and licenses of 
intangibles, enacted in 1986 due to the difficulty in determining 
comparable terms for such transactions, requires that the transferor retain 
what is referred to as a “super royalty” and allows for ex-post adjustments 
based on the income generated from the intangible in question.237  The 
Treasury concluded that the commensurate with income standard did not 
supplant, but is consistent with, the arm’s length standard.238  
The addition of the commensurate with income standard in 1986 was 
not intended to prohibit the use of bona fide research and development 
cost-sharing arrangements.239  However, the parties to such arrangements 
are required to bear a portion of all research and development costs at all 
stages of development regardless of the success or failure of the project.240  
The regulations contain specific rules related to the joint development of 
intangible property under a cost sharing arrangement entered into among 
controlled taxpayers.241  Compliance with these regulations allows 
taxpayers to avoid the uncertainty of whether these arrangements meet the 
arm’s-length standard.242  In general, the parties to a qualified cost-sharing 
arrangement share intangible development costs in proportion to the 
parties’ share of reasonably anticipated benefits.243  The Treasury 
regulations require that stock-based compensation costs directly identified 
with, or reasonably allocable to, the development of intangible property be 
included in the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing arrangement.244  The 
amount and timing of such costs are determined under the rules that govern 
the deductibility of such costs.245  However, a taxpayer may elect to 
determine the amount and timing of the costs of stock options on publicly 
 
methods to be utilized is such methods otherwise satisfy the arm’s-length standard.  See Treas, Reg, § 
1,482-4(a)(2011).  The best method under the circumstances must be selected. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(c)(1)(2012). 
236. I.R.C. § 482 (2016).  
237. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423–26 (1985); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx Revisited, 126 
TAX NOTES 1621 (Mar. 29, 2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2)(2011).  It is not clear whether the 
commensurate with income standard is consistent with, or supersedes, the arm’s-length standard.  See 
Deborah Brubaker Burns, Golden Apple of Discord: International Cost-Sharing Arrangements, 15 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 55, 68 n.57–58 (2015). 
238. See Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 472 (1988).  
239. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol. II), at II-637–38 (1986). 
240. Id. 
241. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2013).  
242. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(a)(3)(2013).  See supra note 235 for the methodologies employed for 
determining the arm’s-length standard with respect to transactions involving the transfer of intangible 
property.   
243. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-7(a)(1); 1.482-1(b)(2013). 
244. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-7(d)(3)(i)-(ii)(2013). 
245. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(3)(iii)(A)(2013). 
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traded stock under generally accepted accounting principles as reflected in 
the taxpayer’s audited financial statements.246  
For tax purposes, stock grants are taxable to the recipient and deductible by 
the employer at the time the stock is transferable by the recipient or not subject to 
a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier.247  The amount of 
income recognized by the transferee from such a transaction is the excess of the 
fair market value of the property received over the amount paid by the recipient 
for such property.248  Correspondingly, the transferor of the property is entitled to 
a compensation deduction, at the time the recipient of the property recognizes 
income, equal to the amount includible in the income of the recipient.249  If, 
however, the stock is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture then the income 
recognition and the corresponding deduction is postponed until such time that 
the risk of forfeiture lapses.250  However, the recipient of restricted property 
may elect to accelerate the incidence of taxation to the time that the 
property is transferred.251  This election also accelerates the employer’s 
compensation deduction.252 
With respect to compensatory stock options, income recognition and 
the compensation deduction are postponed until the date of exercise or 
disposition provided that, at the time the option is granted, it has no readily 
 
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(3)(iii)(B)(2013). 
247. I.R.C. § 83(a)(CCH 2016).  
248. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1)-(2)(CCH 2016).  The fair market value of the property received is 
determined at the time the property is transferable by the recipient or is not subject to substantial risk of 
forfeiture, whichever is earlier.  I.R.C. § 83(a)(1)(CCH 2016).  The property recipient is taxable on the 
appreciation that occurs between the time of grant and the time of vesting despite the fact that, at the 
time of grant, the employee paid full fair market value for the property.  See Alves v. Comm’r, 734 F.2d 
478 (9th Cir. 1984), aff’g 79 T.C. 864 (1982). 
249. I.R.C. § 83(h) (CCH 2016).  
250. Whether a substantial risk of forfeiture exists is a factual question based on all the facts and 
circumstances.  Subjecting the property to continued employment is expressly deemed a substantial risk 
of forfeiture.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1985).  Other circumstances evidencing a substantial risk 
of forfeiture include performance targets and certain covenants not to compete.  The fact that an 
employee is subject to the “short-swing” profit rule of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
will cause the property to be deemed to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.  Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
3(j)(1) (1985). 
251. I.R.C. § 83(b)(CCH 2016).  The election is irrevocable, except with the permission of the 
Commissioner.  I.R.C. § 83(b)(2)(CCH 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(f) (1978).  The postponement of 
taxation until the lapse of vesting restrictions could expose the employee to a very large tax liability if 
the stock’s value increases significantly between the time that the property is received and the time that 
such property is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.  This election is not without its 
risks. In a declining market the stock recipient will have recognized an amount of compensation income 
based on the value of the stock at the date of grant and any subsequent decline in the value of the stock 
will be recognized as a capital loss only upon disposition of the stock.  Moreover, no loss is recognized 
upon the forfeiture of the shares due to the employee’s failure to meet the vesting requirements.  I. R.C. 
§ 83(b)(CCH 2016).  The employer, however, will recognize income on the forfeiture equal to the 
amount of the deduction allowed on the transfer of the forfeited property.  Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
6(c)(2003).  The no-loss rule is inapplicable to amounts paid for the stock by the employee.  See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.83-2(a)(1978).  
252. I.R.C. § 83(h)(CCH 2016). 
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ascertainable fair market value.253  For this purpose, an option has an 
ascertainable fair market value if it is actively traded on an established market or, 
alternatively, it is transferable by the option holder, is immediately exercisable, 
and the underlying property that is the subject of the option is not subject to any 
restriction that has a significant effect on such property’s value.254  
Under generally accepted accounting principles, a grant of restricted 
shares is valued at the date of grant and such amount is charged to expense 
over the vesting period.255  Time-based or performance-based vesting 
restrictions do not, for accounting purposes, preclude a determination of the 
compensation amount at the time of grant.  Instead, such restrictions merely 
affect the time over which such amount is charged to expense.256  Implicit 
in the accounting treatment of share-based compensation is the notion that 
post-grant changes in the market value of the stock are not compensatory in 
nature.  For accounting purposes, stock options are valued at the date of 
grant pursuant to one or more option pricing models.257 
The requirement that equity-based compensation—in particular stock 
option compensation—be included in the cost pool subject to the cost 
sharing arrangement was the subject of a recent Tax Court case.  Altera 
Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and its Cayman Island subsidiary, 
Altera International, entered into a technology licensing agreement and a 
 
253. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a)(1978). 
254. Treas. Reg. §§1.83-7(b)(1); 1.83-7(b)(2)(i)-(iii)(1978). 
255. See generally SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123, §§ 
16,39 (Fin. Acct. Standards Bd. revised 2004).  This standard conformed U.S. accounting standards 
with international accounting standards.  See generally SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Int’l Acct. Standards 
No. 2 (Int’l Acct. Standards Bd. 2004).  Stock options are valued at the date of grant pursuant to one or 
more option pricing models.  See id., Appendix A at §§ A13-A37.  
256. Restrictions that result in the forfeiture of the shares are ignored in determining the fair 
market value of the shares at the date of grant.  Id. at §18.  Thus, shares that are issued subject to a time-
based vesting restriction are valued without consideration of the vesting restriction.  Moreover, certain 
contingent features, such as a clawback provision, are not considered at the time of grant.  Instead, such 
contingencies are accounted for if, and when, they occur.  Id. at § 27.  Special rules are provided if, in 
addition to time-based restrictions, the award also contains performance-based restrictions.  The 
existence of performance-based restrictions does not disturb the valuation of the shares at the date of 
grant. However, such restrictions may impact the time over which the grant is charged to expense.  See 
id. at §§ 40–49. 
257. See id., Appendix A at §§ A13–A37.  Prior to the effective date of this accounting standard, 
compensation expense with respect to stock options was measured by the difference between the market 
price of the stock underlying the option and the exercise price of the option.  As a result, no reported 
compensation expense for at-the-money or out-of-the money stock options resulted. ACCOUNTING FOR 
STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, Accounting Principles Bd. Opinion No. 25, § 10a (Am. Inst. of 
Certified Pub. Accts. 1972).  Later, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued new rules that, 
effective until 2005, encouraged the expensing of stock options at the time of grant but allowed 
corporations to account for the grants under existing rules provided that additional footnote disclosures 
were made.  See generally ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION: TRANSITION AND 
DISCLOSURE, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 148, (Fin. Acct. Standards Bd. 2002); 
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123 (Fin. 
Acct. Standards Bd. 1995). 
1 - MELONE MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2017  11:08 AM 
Winter 2017] LIGHT ON THE MAYO 197 
research and development cost-sharing agreement.258  Certain employees of 
Altera Corporation who performed research and development activities 
were compensated, in part, with stock options and other forms of equity-
based compensation.259  The costs associated with this compensation were 
not included in the cost pool under the corporation’s cost-sharing 
arrangement with its foreign subsidiary.260  The I.R.S. issued notices of 
deficiency to Altera Corporation for each of its taxable years 2004-2007 
that allocated, in total, approximately $80,000,000 in income from Altera 
International to Altera Corporation.261  This income was allocated pursuant 
to I.R.C. section 482 and the Treasury regulation noted above as a result of 
the addition to the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing arrangement 
between the companies of the equity-based compensation paid to research 
and development personnel.262  
The Tax Court discussed its decision in an earlier case, Xilinx, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, that invalidated a previous version of the regulation at issue 
and the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of its decision.263  In that case, the Tax 
Court invalidated the cost-sharing regulation because it was inconsistent 
with the arm’s length standard.264  The evidence indicated that unrelated 
parties did not include equity-based compensation in the cost pool subject 
to cost-sharing.265  In its affirmance, the Ninth Circuit held that the arm’s 
length standard was irreconcilable with the requirement to include all costs, 
including equity-based compensation, in the cost pool subject to a cost-
sharing arrangement.266  According to the Court, the regulations created an 
ambiguity and—based on the dominant purpose of the regulations—the 
arm’s length standard overrides the regulations that require the inclusion of 
equity-based compensation in the cost pool.267  The court did not cite or 
refer to State Farm but Judge Fisher, in concurrence, conceded that the 
Treasury’s position was theoretically plausible but that its position 
warranted no deference because the Treasury had not clearly articulated the 
rationale for its position.268 
Written comments were submitted to the Treasury and testimony 
given at a public hearing by several prominent law and accounting firms, 
trade associations, and academics regarding the regulation at issue in 
 
258. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 3, 2015 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 31, at *2 (2015). 
259. Id. at *3–4. 
260. Id. at *4. 
261. Id.  
262. Id.  
263. Id. at *16–21. 
264. See Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 37, 56–62 (2005). 
265. Id. at 58–62. 
266. Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 598 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). 
267. Id. at 1196–97. 
268. Id. at 1198 (Fisher, J., concurring).  
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Altera.269  The comments and testimony asserted that no contracts between 
unrelated parties included equity-based compensation in the cost pool 
subject to cost-sharing.270  A survey of members of the American 
Electronics Association and model contract provisions used in the 
petroleum industry provided further support that such costs are not subject 
to cost-sharing between unrelated parties primarily because such costs are 
speculative, uncertain, and outside the control of the compensating party.271  
In contrast, the Treasury produced no empirical evidence in support of its 
position and did not attempt to do so.272  Instead, the Treasury supported its 
position in the rather lengthy preamble to the regulations with the assertion 
that comparable transactions for high profit intangibles are not available 
because transactions between unrelated parties do not share enough 
characteristics with transactions among controlled parties.273  The 
Treasury’s explanation echoed, to a significant extent, the reasoning set 
forth in the legislative history of the statute that enacted the commensurate 
with income standard.274   
Despite its acknowledgement that the Supreme Court had never 
applied State Farm to tax regulations, the court held that State Farm 
provided the appropriate standard of review.275  The Treasury argued that 
Chevron supplied the appropriate standard of review in this case because 
the interpretation of I.R.C. section 482 requires no empirical evidence.276  
The court, however, concluded that whether the regulation complied with 
the arm’s length standard, which always require an analysis of comparable 
unrelated party transactions, is an empirical question and is in no way 
dependent on statutory interpretation.277  Accordingly, State Farm provides 
“the more apt analytic framework.”278  The court went on to note that 
whether it applied State Farm or Chevron in this case was immaterial 
because the former is incorporated into the latter.279 
The regulations failed to meet the State Farm standard in four ways. 
First, the regulations lacked any basis in fact because the Treasury was 
unable to produce any evidence that unrelated parties share equity 
 
269. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 3, 2015 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 31, at *23–24. 
270. Id. at *24–25. 
271. Id. at *24–27.  Commentators also noted that the federal procurement regulations prohibit 
the inclusion of equity compensation in the cost-pool subject to federal government reimbursement. 
Additionally, two economists argued that compensatory stock options do not result in any cost to the 
grantor of the options.  See id. at *26–27 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(i)(2013)). 
272. Id.at *28–29. 
273. Id. at *29–34. 
274. Id. at *31. 
275. Id. at *45-46, 49. 
276. Id. at *46.  
277. Id. at *47, 49 (citing Xilinx v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. at 53–55).  
278. Id. at *49 (quoting Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 483). 
279. Id. at *50 (citing Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 483). 
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compensation costs.280  The court dismissed the Treasury’s attempt to 
justify the rule under the commensurate with income standard because this 
standard, by the Treasury’s own admission, is consistent with the arm’s 
length standard and, in any event, the Treasury did not rely exclusively on 
that standard.281  Moreover, the court was not persuaded by the Treasury’s 
assertion that scant empirical evidence exists for certain propositions.  
According to the court, the evidence produced that contradicted the 
Treasury’s position and the evidence produced in Xilinx belied this 
assertion.282  Moreover, the Treasury could not have rationally concluded 
that scant evidence was available because it never attempted to marshal any 
empirical evidence.283  
Second, the court held that there was no rational connection with the 
regulations and the facts found by the Treasury.284  If the Treasury was 
correct in its belief that cost-sharing arrangements for the development of 
high-profit intangibles have no unrelated party counterparts, then the 
regulation should have distinguished between cost-sharing arrangements 
for the development of such intangibles and those arrangements for the 
development of other intangibles.285  Instead, the regulations apply its 
requirements to all cost-sharing arrangements. Support for a uniform rule 
on the ground of administrative convenience was not sufficient because the 
Treasury did not articulate this reason for the rule.286  Moreover, even if 
this rationale was articulated, the Treasury provided no facts to determine 
whether the rule is justified by its purported administrative benefits.287  
Third, the court believed that the Treasury failed to adequately 
respond to the comments it received concerning the regulations.288  In many 
respects, this failure is closely related to the court’s first objection to the 
regulations. The lack of any empirical evidence in support of the 
Treasury’s position relegated the Treasury’s response to the comments it 
received as mere assertions to the contrary.289  Finally, the court held that 
the regulations are contrary to the evidence.290  The credibility of the 
evidence marshaled against the regulation was not called into question and 
no evidence to the contrary was presented.291  
 
280. Id. at *59. 
281. Id. at *51–54. 
282. Id. at *55–57. 
283. Id. at *57. 
284. Id. at *62. 
285. Id. at *59–60. 
286. Id. at *61. 
287. Id.  
288. Id. at *69–70. 
289. Id. at *68–70. 
290. Id. at *70–71. 
291. Id.  
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The court dismissed the Treasury’s argument that the regulation 
should be upheld under the harmless error rule despite any deficiencies in 
the agency’s reasoning.292  The court was not persuaded by the Treasury’s 
assertions that it had sufficient alternative reasons for its position and that 
subsequent developments in financial reporting evidenced that its position 
is settled policy.293  The Treasury never indicated that it was prepared to 
rely on any reasons other than the arm’s length standard as a basis for its 
adoption of the regulation and, due to treaty obligations, it was not clear 
that the agency would have underpinned the rule on something other than 
the arm’s length standard.294  With respect to subsequent financial reporting 
development the court held that such developments were not relevant 
because the Treasury itself disavowed financial reporting standards in 
promulgating the rule and, in any event, Chenery precludes reliance on ex 
post developments.295   
 
1. Analysis and Critique 
 
Although searching judicial scrutiny of the actions of tax authorities, I 
imagine, would be welcome by most taxpayers, the Tax Court’s decision is 
perplexing in several respects.  First, the court reviewed the Treasury 
regulation at issue against the arm’s length standard as if that standard is set 
forth in a statute, which it is not.  The arm’s length standard is itself a 
creature of Treasury regulations.296  Consequently, the court’s application 
of the various standards of review was inapt.  Second, the court refused to 
accept administrative convenience as a reasoned justification for the 
regulation without supporting evidence.297  This runs counter to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo and has created confusion as to whether 
a naked assertion of administrative convenience will be countenanced as 
justification for other regulations.  Finally, given the nature and purpose of 
the cost-sharing regulations it appears that the Treasury provided a lucid 
and reasoned justification despite its failure to muster supporting empirical 
data.  
The cost-sharing regulations implemented the statutory mandates that 
allocations of various tax items clearly reflect income and that the income 
with respect to transfers or licenses of intangible assets be commensurate 
with the income attributable to the intangibles.298  Clearly, the statutory 
 
292. The harmless error rule is based on § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and allows a 
court to upheld an agency action if the agency’s mistake was not outcome determinative.  See id at *42. 
293. Id. at *71–74. 
294. Id. at *72–73. 
295. Id. at *73–74. 
296. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text. 
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language is sufficiently ambiguous to pass Chevron step one.  The court 
reviewed the regulations against the arm’s length standard which, in the 
court’s opinion, always requires an examination of comparable unrelated 
party transactions.299  Accordingly, the court believed that Chevron step 
two would have yielded the same result that the application of State Farm 
yielded.300  However, even if one concedes that the court was correct that 
the arm’s length standard always requires the use of comparable 
transactions, the cost-sharing regulations conflicted with a regulation and 
not a statutory mandate.  Chevron step two should not have been implicated 
on this basis.  Instead, Auer provides the more appropriate standard of 
review.301  
The court pointedly noted that the regulation in no way was predicated 
on the Treasury’s interpretation of a statute.302  Instead, the Treasury was 
required to show whether unrelated parties share equity-based 
compensation and this was an empirical question.  Accordingly, State Farm 
supplied the appropriate standard of review.303  However, the cost-sharing 
regulations interpreted the commensurate with income standard and its 
relationship to the arm’s length standard.304  In effect, the Treasury was 
interpreting both the statute and its own regulations. Chevron step two 
should have been applied to determine whether the regulations permissibly 
construed the commensurate with income standard and Auer should have 
been applied to determine whether the regulations were permissible in light 
of the long-standing regulatory-based arm’s length standard.  The 
legislative history of the commensurate with income standard stated that 
cost-sharing arrangements were permissible if such arrangements provided 
for a sharing of all costs.305  In light of the legislative history, the inclusion 
of equity compensation costs in the cost pool is, in my opinion, a 
reasonable interpretation of the commensurate with income standard and, 
therefore, Chevron step two is satisfied.  I also believe that the inclusion of 
equity-based compensation in the cost pool is not plainly inconsistent with 
the arm’s length standard and, therefore, the regulation should pass muster 
under Auer.  At this point, State Farm requires that the rule chosen by the 
Treasury have adequate justification. 
The Treasury asserted that the requirement that all cost-sharing 
arrangements include equity-based compensation in the cost pool was 
based, in part, on administrative convenience.306  The court required more 
 
299. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
300. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra note 54.  
302. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. 
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from the Treasury than a categorical assertion, insisting that the Treasury 
provide data to support this justification.307  Administrative convenience is 
a common justification for bright-line rules and common sense dictates that 
bright-line rules are administrable with relative ease.  For example, in 
Mayo, the Court accepted the Treasury’s explanation that the rule that 
subjects medical residents to payroll taxes was based, in part, on 
administrative convenience.308  The Court did not inquire whether a 
categorical exemption for medical residents would have yielded similar, or 
perhaps, greater administrative benefits.  For that matter, the Court did not 
examine any supporting data for the Treasury’s assertion that the broad 
purposes of the Social Security program were served by a rule that 
broadened the program’s coverage.  It is quite possible that, after a long 
career as a physician, a person’s social security benefits are unaffected by 
whether she was subject to tax as a medical resident.   Chevron does not 
require that the best policy alternative be chosen, only a permissible one. 
Neither does State Farm.  
The most problematic aspect of the Tax Court’s opinion is that it 
failed to understand the nature of the transactions governed by, and the 
purpose of, the cost-sharing regulations.  As a result, the evidence it 
required from the Treasury to satisfy State Farm was impossible to 
produce.  In many respects, the arm’s length standard is a fiction and, in the 
case of high-profit intangible assets, is a fiction.  The use of comparable 
transactions to ascertain whether transactions between controlled entities 
clearly reflect income assumes that transactions between unrelated parties 
and transactions among controlled group members share similar economic 
attributes. Controlled groups have collective assets—management, 
information systems, sources of financing, institutional memory, brand 
equity, and culture, for example—that lead such groups to enter into 
transactions that would not be offered to anyone outside the group.309  
Moreover, the transactional approach of the arm’s length standard often 
fails to properly source the parties’ allocable share of non-routine, or 
residual, profits.310  
The arm’s length standard may be adequate to allocate profits among 
controlled group members with respect to the sale of routine goods and 
services that have little or no potential to generate residual profits. 
However, this standard is not well-suited to a post-industrial economy in 
which the creation and use intangible assets is central to wealth creation.  
 
307. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
308. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 59. 
309. See Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and the 
Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 642–45 (2007). 
310. See Bret Well & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s 
Length Standard, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 737, 745–65 (discussing one-sided and two-sided pricing 
methodologies and the deficiencies in the former methodology).  
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Intangible assets are often specialized, are efficiently deployed only in the 
context of a controlled group, and require exclusivity to protect market 
share.311  As a result, comparable transactions do not exist.  
The Tax Court, in the absence of evidence that unrelated parties share 
equity compensation costs, invalidated the regulations’ requirement that 
related parties share such costs. State Farm requires that the Treasury 
provide a reasoned explanation for the adoption of the rule in question.  
The preamble to the regulations explained that comparable transactions do 
not exist for the sharing of research of development costs with respect to 
high-profit intangibles and that the regulations attempt to clearly reflect 
income among related parties in the absence of such comparable 
transactions.312  The explanation put forth echoed the legislative history of 
the commensurate with income standard.313 As discussed above, the Tax 
Court insisted that the sine qua non of the arm’s length standard is 
comparable transactions.314  If one assumes that the court’s interpretation of 
the arm’s length standard is the correct one—a dubious assumption—then 
such an interpretation fails to cover situations in which no comparable 
transactions exist.  This was the basis of the Treasury’s adoption of the rule 
and was explained as such.  The Supreme Court, in upholding the Federal 
Communications Commission’s repeal of its long-standing “fleeting 
expletives” safe harbor, deferred to the agency’s intuition and noted that 
“there are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be 
marshalled . . . .”315  Agency intuition forms part of what two scholars 
referred to a “tacit expertise” and often influences agency decisions.316  
This “tacit expertise” is developed through experience.  The Treasury has 
grappled with tax base erosion for a long-time and its expertise informed 
the belief that unrelated transactions are not comparable to research and 
development arrangements among controlled entities.   
The court’s rigidity with respect to evidence of comparable cost-
sharing arrangements is all the more perplexing because the cost-sharing 
regulations themselves are a safe harbor and deviate from the terms to 
which unrelated parties would ostensibly agree.  As discussed above, the 
cost-sharing regulations were designed as a response to the administrative 
burdens and regulatory uncertainty imposed by I.R.C. section 482.317  
Adherence to the regulatory requirements provides taxpayers with the 
assurance that their resultant profit splits will go undisturbed.  Taxpayers 
are free to ignore the cost-sharing regulations and take their chances under 
 
311. See Benshalom, supra note 309, at 645–47.  
312. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
314. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
315. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009). 
316. See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 195, at 1396–1401. 
317. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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the other rules set forth in the regulations.  The cost-sharing regulations 
contain several provisions whose incorporation into an arm’s length 
agreement would be unlikely.  For example, the regulations require that a 
party to a cost-sharing agreement provide payment for pre-existing research 
and platform rights and require adjustments if the actual benefits derived 
deviate from projected results to a certain extent.318  Moreover, costs are 
funded by the parties in proportion to the benefits they expect to derive 
from the research and development effort.319  In contrast to the profit-split 
method described elsewhere in the regulations, the cost-sharing regulations 
focus solely on funding and make no allowance for expertise and know-
how.320  Moreover, this approach assumes that the funding parties bear 
commensurate financial risks which may or may not be true in a controlled 
group setting.321  
Dominion Resources and Altera may very well motivate taxpayers to 
take their scrutiny of tax regulations beyond Chevron.  A tax regulation that 
appears to be a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute may 
nonetheless be inadequately justified by the Treasury.  Regulations that are 
accompanied by explanations that recite the operation of rules 
unaccompanied by the reasons for the rules, that justify bright-line rules on 
the grounds of administrative convenience in a conclusory manner, that do 
not address comments that object to the rules in question, and that fail to 
explain why alternative approaches were dismissed are particularly 
vulnerable.  Mayo made clear that tax regulations are not exceptional and, 
consequently, it should not come as a surprise that administrative law 
principles long applicable to other agencies have surfaced in tax cases.  
Whether or not the Treasury adjusts its rulemaking procedures probably 
depends on the regularity with which State Farm appears on the tax 
landscape and whether the courts invalidate regulations that don’t pass 






318. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-7(g); 1.482-7(f)(3)(2013).  Valuation of preexisting research and 
platform rights poses its own difficulties.  See Deepa Seetharaman, IRS Sues Facebook Over Irish 
Transfer, WALL ST. J. July 8, 2016, at B4 (reporting on the dispute between the I.R.S. and Facebook 
over the valuation of certain intangible assets transferred to its Irish subsidiary).   
319. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
320. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(b)(2009).  This provisions states that “[t]he relative 
value of each controlled taxpayer's contribution to the success of the relevant business activity must be 
determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed, risks assumed, and resources employed 
by each participant in the relevant business activity . . . .” 
321. See Benshalom, supra note 309, at 660–61. See also Debra Brubaker Burns, Golden Apple 
of Discord: International Cost-Sharing Arrangements, 15 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 55 (2015) 
(discussing the application of the cost-sharing regulations to Apple, Inc.). 
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CONCLUSION  
 
From a procedural standpoint, Treasury rulemaking has been subject 
to much criticism.  The agency too often has skirted the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act and its behavior led to much confusion 
regarding the level of judicial deference to which its actions were entitled.  
Mayo made clear that Treasury regulations were entitled to the same 
deference as that enjoyed by other agency regulations.  At the time, Mayo 
was interpreted as an unmitigated victory for the Treasury.  King v. 
Burwell, however, provides taxpayers with two arguments with which to 
challenge the agency’s entitlement to Chevron deference—the 
extraordinary issue and the Treasury’s lack of expertise.  Moreover, as two 
recent tax cases illustrate, the equipoise that Mayo created between 
Treasury and other agency regulations has introduced the State Farm 
doctrine to tax rulemaking.  As a result, the Treasury may be forced to 
provide more reasoned justifications for its actions than it has been 
accustomed to providing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
